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The Voting Rights Act in Winter:
The Death of a Superstatute
Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer
ABSTRACT: The Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), the most successful civil rights
statute in American history, is dying. In the recent Shelby County decision,
the U.S. Supreme Court signaled that the anti-discrimination model, long
understood as the basis for the VRA as originally enacted, is no longer the best
way to understand today’s voting rights questions. As a result, voting rights
activists need to face up to the fact that voting rights law and policy are at a
critical moment of transition. It is likely the case that the superstatute we once
knew as the VRA is no more and is never to return. If so, we need to figure
out what, if anything, can, will, or should replace it. But before figuring out
where to go from here, we need to understand first how we arrived at the
moment of the VRA’s disintegration so as not to repeat the mistakes of the not
too distant past. In this Article, we argue that the VRA is dying because the
consensus over the existence and persistence of racial discrimination in voting
has dissolved. From this premise, we outline three paths for the future of voting
rights policy: (1) rebuilding a new consensus over the racial discrimination
model; (2) forging a new consensus over what we call an autonomy model;
or (3) reconceiving voting rights in universal terms.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) is dying. As we begin to chart a new
course, we must understand why. The unraveling of the VRA is a remarkable
moment in the history of voting rights law in the United States. Not only is the
Act widely regarded as the most successful civil rights statute ever enacted by
Congress, but it is also unlike ordinary legislation. From the moment the
Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of the Act in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach,1 the Court has generally treated the VRA like a special
statute, a superstatute.2 A term of art, the word “superstatute” describes a
category of landmark legislation that addresses a significant public policy
problem that if left unresolved would call into question a fundamental

1.
2.

See generally South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
See infra Part II.
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constitutional commitment.3 The Supreme Court has, until recently, by and
large, accepted the voting rights agenda represented by the VRA and viewed
Congress and the executive branch as co-equal partners that were effectuating
constitutional commands.
One cannot read the early voting rights cases and view the Court as a
neutral and detached arbiter on voting rights policy. As befits a superstatute,
the Court interpreted the VRA pragmatically and gave effect to Congress’s
aim in enacting the statute even if it meant interpreting both the statute and
the Constitution elastically in order to do so. More importantly, the Court has
generally viewed Congress and the Executive as its partners when interpreting
the VRA. Consequently, the VRA, as it existed prior to the Court’s recent
decision in Shelby County v. Holder,4 was best understood as a joint product of
Congress, the Executive, and the Court.
Shelby County marks the death of the VRA as a superstatute. Specifically,
the Court struck down the Act’s coverage formula, which identified the states
that were subject to the Act’s special provisions, and it effectively neutered the
existing preclearance regime.5 This is significant; it signals that the
partnership between Congress and the Executive, on one side, and the Court,
on the other side, has disintegrated. With Shelby County and its herald,
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder (“Northwest Austin”),6
the Court is cautiously dismantling the most important civil rights statute in
our nation’s history. The strong message of Shelby County is that the voting
rights era—and maybe much more broadly, the civil rights era—as we have
known it, is over.
The question for the foreseeable future is where does voting rights policy
go from here? Not surprisingly, voting rights activists have called on President
Barack Obama and Congress to enact a new coverage formula.7 Indeed, a few
weeks after the Shelby County decision, President Obama convened civil rights
leaders to the White House to reassure them that his Administration is

3. See infra notes 15–20 and accompanying text.
4. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (invalidating the VRA’s section
4(b) preclearance formula).
5. Id.
6. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
7. Commentators have suggested various fixes to the VRA, including using section 2
lawsuits as the basis for designing a new coverage formula. See Bernard Grofman, Devising a Sensible
Trigger for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 12 ELECTION L.J. 332, 334 (2013) (proposing that social
science data on section 2 litigation be used to create a new trigger for section 5 coverage); see also
Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, The Geography of Racial Stereotyping: Evidence and
Implications for VRA Preclearance After Shelby County, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1123, 1174 (2014)
(arguing that Congress should create a default coverage formula that could then be updated by
the Department of Justice or another agency); Spencer Overton, Voting Rights Disclosure, 127
HARV. L. REV. F. 19, 29 (2013) (arguing that Congress should, among other things, update the
preclearance formula).
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committed to a bipartisan fix for the Act.8 Attorney General Eric Holder, for
his part, promised to use the remaining sections of the VRA to vigorously
enforce voting rights policy. And as evidence of his commitment, Attorney
General Holder filed suit in Texas and asked a lower court to use section 3(c)
of the VRA to once again require the state to preclear some voting changes.9
As these early responses to Shelby County reveal, many of the proposed
fixes and reactions to the decision reflect an attempt to restore the status quo
ante. These early efforts have been aimed at promoting aggressive section 2
litigation, using section 3’s bail-in provision, and using section 2 cases to craft
a new coverage provision. Importantly, these strategies critically depend upon
the continued persistence of racial discrimination in voting by state actors as
the central problem of voting rights policy. This is because the most critical
justification for the VRA has long been the presence, profundity, and
persistence of intentional racial discrimination in voting by state actors.10
More importantly, modern voting rights law and policy is held together by a
consensus that clearly understood the reality, pervasiveness, and extent of
racial discrimination by state actors in democratic politics.11 This antidiscrimination consensus is the foundation upon which modern voting rights
law is built.
However, rightly or wrongly, the Court no longer believes that
intentional racial discrimination by state actors remains the dominant
problem of democratic politics. The decision in Shelby County is clear evidence
that the Court’s current conservative majority believes that the regulatory
model that has undergirded modern voting rights policy and has been in
place for almost 50 years is no longer tenable because of what it views as the
sufficient decline of intentional racial discrimination by state actors.12 Shelby
8. See Jackie Calmes, Obama Reassures Leaders on Enforcing Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES (July 29,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/us/politics/obama-reassures-leaders-on-enforcingvoting-rights.html.
9. See Adam Liptak & Charlie Savage, U.S. Asks Court to Limit Texas on Ballot Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (July 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/holder-wants-texas-to-clearvoting-changes-with-the-us.html.
10. S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 2 (2006) (“The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted to remedy
95 years of pervasive racial discrimination in voting, which resulted in the almost complete
disenfranchisement of minorities in certain areas of the country.” (citation omitted)).
11. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H5055 (daily ed. July 12, 2006) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez)
(“What a wonderful opportunity for Democrats and Republicans to come together and reignite
that shining light in the conscience of man.”); id. at H5053 (statement of Rep. Scott) (“In
Virginia, my home State, because of all sorts of schemes and barriers, there were no African
American State legislators or Federal legislators, not a single African American State or Federal
judge in 1964. . . . We do not need to return to the days before 1965.”).
12. As Professor Samuel Issacharoff wrote recently in advancing a similar point: “The critical
assumptions of the challenged provisions of the Act corresponded to a world in which overt racial
exclusion meant that black citizens faced first-order impediments simply to getting registered to
vote and in which only the federal government could assume the responsibility to challenge the
persistence of Jim Crow.” Samuel Issacharoff, Comment, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting,
127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 96–97 (2013).
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County is the product of the majority’s frustration with what it regards as the
backward-looking nature of the VRA’s statutory scheme. In other words, the
discrimination consensus is disintegrating. And, as we argue below, Shelby
County signals the unraveling of the voting rights law and policy of the past
half-century.
The existing dissensus about the nature and extent of racial
discrimination, coupled with the Court’s skepticism about what it views as a
backward-looking statutory framework, surrounds the future of voting rights
policy in a fog of uncertainty. Nevertheless, one thing is clear: any attempt to
use the existing statutory provisions to recreate the status quo ante, which turns
upon the persistence of intentional discrimination as a critical fulcrum, is
likely to ground upon the same shoals that grounded sections 4(b) and 5.
Moreover, to the extent that intentional racial discrimination by state
actors is not sufficiently descriptive of the present risk to voting rights and not
sufficiently predictive of the future of voting rights, voting rights policy built
upon the disintegrating consensus of intentional discrimination is not only
backward-looking, but also bad policy. The attempt to preserve as much of the
old model as possible is likely to put pressure on the existing provisions of the
Act, in particular sections 2 and 3(c), to capture as much of what has been
lost as possible.13 Creative interpretations of sections 2 and 3(c) will simply
increase the risk that the current Court majority further dismantles—and
hastens the demise of—the remaining provisions of the Act. This is the reason
why we are skeptical that the proposed fixes to Shelby County under discussion
and the attempt to restore the status quo ante will have long-term traction.
Voting rights activists need to face up to the fact that voting rights law
and policy are at a critical moment of transition. It is likely the case that the
superstatute we once knew as the VRA is no more and is never to return. If so,
we need to figure out what, if anything, can, will, or should replace it. But
before figuring out where to go from here, we need to first understand how
we arrived at the moment of the VRA’s disintegration so as not to repeat the
mistakes of the near past.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II examines how the Court
understood the VRA prior to Shelby County and focuses on how the Court
cooperated with both Congress and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to give
effect to the Act. Part III focuses specifically on how the Court has interpreted
the VRA. In particular, we argue that the Court has generally interpreted the
Act pragmatically. Part IV explores the current dissensus over voting rights
policy, which we argue is a function of the Court’s perception that intentional
discrimination is no longer the critical problem in voting rights policy and a

13. For arguments that section 3(c) can be an effective tool in voting right enforcement,
see generally Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and
Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992 (2010); Roseann R. Romano, Note, Devising a Standard
for Section 3: Post-Shelby County Voting Rights Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 387 (2014).
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function of the failure of Congress to provide a new focus for voting rights law
other than the intentional discrimination model. Part V looks to the future
and the questions that a new consensus in voting rights policy must face.
II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AS A SUPERSTATUTE
To understand the extent to which the Court’s decision in Shelby County
is a radical departure from prior voting rights precedent and why it marks an
important moment in voting rights history, we must first understand the way
that the Court has viewed the VRA in the past. As we show in this Part, the
Supreme Court never regarded the VRA as just another ordinary statute.
Generally, the Court has understood the VRA as representing a significant
historical intervention in the life of the country. As such, the Court has
willingly partnered with Congress and the executive branch to give effect to
the Act. Though Congress and the DOJ certainly deserve much credit for the
fact that the VRA has been such a successful statute, the Court deserves a
significant amount of credit as well.14 More importantly, the Court has rarely
viewed itself as a neutral arbiter of voting rights policy. Rather, the Court has
interpreted the VRA pragmatically, often expansively, and in a manner
consistent with what it views as the Act’s ideals.
To appreciate this argument, we situate the VRA within a body of
scholarship and framework that identifies a set of statues, including the VRA,
as “superstatutes.”15 A superstatute is landmark legislation that addresses a
significant public policy question, the resolution of which compels the
cooperation of all branches of government.16 Because superstatutes depend
upon a fair amount of inter-branch cooperation, the courts and
administrative agencies are also involved in a significant amount of
policymaking.
A superstatute takes form when a fundamental element of our
constitutional or first-order principles is renegotiated. A superstatute is the
instantiation of that renegotiation. Superstatutes occupy the interstices
between constitutional commitments and ordinary legislation. While
superstatutes do not quite have the normative pull of constitutional
provisions, they are much more than ordinary legislation. Superstatutes are
aimed at the big, fundamental questions of the day. Though these
fundamental public policy questions may not always rise to the level of
constitutional or first-order principle, they are clearly beyond the ken of
everyday legislation.
14. Richard Valelly also makes this point in his wonderful book. See RICHARD M. VALELLY,
THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT 202–03 (2004).
15. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 88 (2010).
16. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216
(2001); see also Stephen M. Rich, One Law of Race?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 201, 207 n.20 (2014)
(discussing the role of superstatutes in shaping “legal policy and popular opinion”).
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Two criteria distinguish ordinary legislation from superstatutes. These
criteria may not be sufficient, but they are necessary. First, a superstatute must
be a landmark statute. By landmark statute we mean a major piece of
legislation that either establishes an important principle or addresses a
significant public policy problem that, if left unresolved, would call into
question a fundamental (constitutional or first-order) commitment.17 This is
not to say that the principle or commitment is not contestable or that broad
consensus exists. Moreover, the commitment need not be one of
constitutional import.18 But the statute must address a significant national
problem or stand for a fundamental principle.19
Second, a superstatute demands more than typical interbranch
engagement or interaction. A necessary distinguishing characteristic of a
superstatute is that the statute obliges a significantly greater level of
engagement by the judicial and executive branches than would be expected
if one were applying the traditional principal–agent model of statutory
interpretation.20 What makes a statute eligible for super status is that the

17. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a good example of a superstatute that implicates both
constitutional and first-order principles. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
18. The Sherman Antitrust Act is a good example of a superstatute that may not implicate
an explicit constitutional principle. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp,
485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (“The Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its
dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the
common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”).
19. The recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act serves as a good
example here. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). It is a major piece of legislation
that addresses a significant problem. It may also be understood as establishing or giving rise to
an important principle—a right to affordable health care. See Abbe R. Gluck, Essay, Intrastatutory
Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond,
121 YALE L.J. 534, 539 (2011) (discussing federalism in the context of “the first major piece of
national social rights legislation since the 1960s”); Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers:
The Submerged Constitution of American Healthcare, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 233 (2012)
(arguing that the legislation establishes the principle of affordable health care through
“cooperative federalism”).
20. On this model, statutory interpreters are agents assigned with the task of translating and
implementing the wishes of the legislature, its principal. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
179, 189 (1986) (“In our system of government the framers of statutes . . . are the superiors of
the judges. The framers communicate orders to the judges through legislative texts. . . . If the
orders are clear, the judges must obey them.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent
conception of the role of courts in statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the
legislature. . . . The judicial task is to discern and apply a judgment made by others, most notably
the legislature.” (footnote omitted)); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation
of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1313 (1990)
(“Traditional democratic theory suggests that the court interpreting a statute must act as the
faithful agent of the legislature’s intent.”).
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coordinate branches are compelled to self-consciously lend their institutional
capital and institutional competence in order to resolve the public policy
question the statute addresses. More importantly, the coordinate branches
take ownership of the statute or its public policy domain. As we argue below,
this necessarily means that statutory interpreters will engage in superstatutory
interpretation—and superstatutory interpretation will be justified—when the
institutional expertise of the coordinate branches is required to effectuate the
statute’s broad and evolving purpose. While courts in some cases will have a
significant advantage over Congress and administrative agencies, other times,
in order to effectuate the statute’s purpose, these agencies must take the lead
in broadly interpreting the statute and filling significant statutory gaps. Thus,
depending upon the circumstances, courts will have to defer to agencies or
Congress and vice versa. As a general rule, no one institution will be supreme
over another. Deference is contextual. This is precisely what we see with the
VRA.
A. LANDMARK STATUTE
As a threshold matter, superstatutes differ from ordinary statutes in that
superstatutes are landmark statutes directed toward resolving fundamental
public policy problems. In our view, statutes can reach landmark status in one
of two ways.
First, a statute that is enacted explicitly to elucidate or give effect to a
constitutional command is likely to be a landmark statute. This is true, for
example, in the case of the VRA. On its terms, the aim of the VRA is to
eliminate racial discrimination in the electoral process.21 Eliminating racial
discrimination is obviously a core or fundamental commitment,
constitutionalized in the Fifteenth Amendment.22
A statute may also satisfy this condition when it gives effect to democratic
principles that are fundamental and deeply rooted in our legal tradition. The
Sherman Antitrust Act is an example. Through the Act, Congress has codified
the fundamental democratic principle of free competition and the notion
that monopolistic behavior is a threat to economic liberty.23 Other statutes

21. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (explaining that the VRA
was intended “to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the
electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century”).
22. For another example of a statute that aims to promote a core democratic commitment,
see Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012)). The APA, in the words of Senator Pat McCarran, “is a
bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated
in one way or another by agencies of the Federal Government. It is designed to provide guaranties
of due process in administrative procedure.” 92 CONG. REC. 2149 (1946) (statement of Sen.
McCarran). In other words, the APA reflects the core democratic commitments expressed in the
due process clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
23. See Louis Brandeis, Monopoly, in THE WORDS OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS 131, 133 (Solomon
Goldman ed., 1953) (“Concentration of power has been shown to be dangerous in a democracy,
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that must be considered landmark statutes include the Social Security Act,24
the National Labor Relations Act,25 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26
Consider also the longstanding health-care debate, which culminated in the
enactment of the Affordable Care Act. As Ted Ruger observes, we are “in the
midst of a fractious and polyphonic debate about the future shape of [the
United States’] healthcare finance and delivery system.”27 This is a debate,
Ruger argues, that “implicates foundational questions of government
authority and constitutional limitation that have transcended the traditional
boundaries of health law.”28 The common thread running through these
statutes is the fact that they give expression to basic, core American ideals,
what Cass Sunstein calls “constitutive commitments.”29
Second, a landmark statute is likely to be a statute that generates a new
paradigm or baseline. One may define “paradigm” as “the entire constellation
of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given
community.”30 It is this constellation, in turn, that forms the basis for further
study and reflection. For our purposes, by paradigm we mean that the statute
must generate a new line of thinking that is different from the one in place
prior to the promulgation of the statute. The critical focus here is not that the
statute necessarily embodies the new paradigm itself, but that it gives rise to

even though that power may be used beneficently.”); Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Women’s Rights,
Affirmative Action, and the Myth of Individualism, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 338, 369 (1986)
(“‘Jacksonian Democracy’ meant, among other things, government action to prevent monopoly
and other impediments to individual access to the market. The Sherman Antitrust Act could be
interpreted in the same spirit.”); P. Blake Keating, Historical Origins of Workmen’s Compensation
Laws in the United States: Implementing the European Social Insurance Idea, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
279, 295 (2001–2002) (“The unrest of the Progressives owed much to this class of citizens whose
powers of economic decision had been limited by the rise of the corporation. They feared an end
to traditional American democracy, for the great combinations were such concentrated centers
of wealth and power that they could subvert all other interests.”); Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom
of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2671 (2008) (“The Framers noted the
potential for large, for-profit, organizations to accumulate the type of power that can threaten
the stability of democracy.”).
24. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 301–1397mm (2012)).
25. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)).
26. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Essay, Equal Protection by
Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 502 (2000)
(arguing that “Americans now believe that a core function of the federal government is to
prohibit discrimination in the public and private sectors”).
27. Ruger, supra note 19, at 215.
28. Id.
29. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND
WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 61–62 (2004) (stating that constitutive commitments “are
not mentioned expressly,” but “[t]hey have a special place in the sense that they are widely
accepted and cannot be eliminated without a fundamental change in social understanding”).
30. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 174 (4th ed. 2012).
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the new paradigm.31 Crucially, we note that paradigms are not merely
replicated. Instead, they are subject to further elucidation and articulation,
“like an accepted judicial decision in the common law.”32 The new paradigm
may be in the service of addressing an important public policy, such as racial
equality in the political process, or it may announce a new framework
changing the balance and separation of powers, such as the Administrative
Procedure Act.33
Consider this point in the context of the VRA. The statute is paradigmshifting because, by making democratic participation practically available to
citizens of color, the VRA re-conceptualized American democracy. As a
consequence of the VRA, people of color in all states became self-governing,
a privilege that was previously reserved to whites. The VRA redefined “We the
People” by exerting a gravitational pull on the meaning of the Constitution
itself. The VRA gave life to the inert ideals of the Fifteenth Amendment.34 In
order to realize the promises of the Fifteenth Amendment, the VRA changed
the baseline that demarcated the relationship between federal and state
governments, and between the Supreme Court and coordinate branches of
the federal government.35
Guinn v. United States set the pre-VRA baseline for our understanding of
the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment and the existing line that marks
the relationship between the federal government and the states. Following its
admission to the Union in 1907, Oklahoma amended its state constitution in
1910 to impose a literacy requirement for voting. In Guinn, the Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s literacy test and of an
attendant grandfather clause that ensured that the literacy test applied only
to black male Oklahomans.36 The literacy test precluded anyone who could
not “read and write any section of the Constitution of the state of Oklahoma”
from registering to vote and from voting.37 The grandfather clause provision
included the following exemption:
31. Thus, this criterion differs from one of Eskridge and Ferejohn’s criterion for identifying
a superstatute, which is that the statute “embodie[s] a new principle or policy displacing common
law baselines, responsive to important social or economic challenges facing the country.”
ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 26.
32. KUHN, supra note 30, at 23.
33. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012)).
34. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE
UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 12–13 (1999).
35. For an illustration of the point that the VRA was paradigm-shifting, compare Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347, 367–68 (1915) (finding a grandfather clause exception to literacy
tests unconstitutional), and Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53–54
(1959) (upholding the use of literacy tests on the basis that their application was not
discriminatory), with Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657–58 (1966) (upholding the
constitutionality of the VRA provision placing a temporary ban on literacy tests).
36. Guinn, 238 U.S. at 356–57.
37. Id. at 357.
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[N]o person, who was, on January 1, 1866, or at any time prior
thereto, entitled to vote under any form of government, or who at
that time resided in some foreign nation, and no lineal descendant
of such person, shall be denied the right to register and vote because
of his inability to so read and write sections of such Constitution.38
Because black male Oklahomans were not guaranteed suffrage until the
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, the grandfather clause
assured that the literacy test applied only to them. The plaintiffs in Guinn were
state election officials prosecuted by the federal government for conspiring to
deprive black voters of their right to vote in Oklahoma.39
In a unanimous opinion, the Court easily concluded that the grandfather
clause violated the Fifteenth Amendment. The Fifteenth Amendment, the
Court observed, “in express terms restricts the power of the United States or
the states to abridge or deny the right of a citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”40 Moreover, the
Fifteenth Amendment is “self-executing and reached without legislative
action the conditions of discrimination against which it was aimed.”41 The
Court concluded that there is no “room for any serious dispute” that the
grandfather clause violated the Fifteenth Amendment.42 Though the clause
did not explicitly discriminate on the basis of race, the Court argued that the
clause “inherently brings that result into existence since it is based purely
upon a period of time before the enactment of the [Fifteenth] Amendment,
and makes that period the controlling and dominant test of the right of
suffrage.”43 The Court noted that there was no justification for picking 1866
as the grandfathering date except to avoid the application of the Fifteenth
Amendment.44 By setting the grandfathering line before the ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment, the clause “re-creates and perpetuates the very
conditions which the Amendment was intended to destroy.”45 Consequently,
the grandfather clause was unconstitutional.
But the Court treated the literacy test very differently. As sure as the Court
was that the grandfather clause violated the Fifteenth Amendment, it was
equally sure that the literacy test did not. “No time need be spent on the
question of the validity of the literacy test,” Chief Justice White declared.46
The literacy test standing alone is “but the exercise by the state of a lawful

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 363.
Id.
Id. at 364–65.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 366.
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power vested in it, not subject to [judicial] supervision, and indeed, its validity
is admitted.”47 And indeed, its validity was admitted.48
The Court and the federal government agreed that the state had the
power to promulgate a literacy test and that the test did not implicate the
Fifteenth Amendment.49 The Fifteenth Amendment, the Court remarked,
“d[id] not change, modify, or deprive the states of their full power as to
suffrage except, of course, as to the subject with which the Amendment deals
and to the extent that obedience to its command is necessary.”50
Indeed, the Court declined to rule the whole scheme unconstitutional
and decided to excise the grandfather clause from the literacy requirement
on the theory that the literacy requirement was “a right whose exercise lies at
the very basis of government” and that a court should refrain from interfering
with the state’s prerogative unless absolutely necessary.51 Moreover, and most
saliently, the United States conceded it did not have the constitutional
authority to preclude the state from promulgating a literacy test.52
Guinn warranted at least three observations about the constitutional
baseline. First, the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited the states from
implementing grandfather clauses that facilitated racial discrimination in
voting.53 Second, where the states violated the Fifteenth Amendment, the
federal government did not overstep its boundaries in prosecuting state
officials. Third, however, the Fifteenth Amendment did not authorize the
federal government to prosecute state officials when the state sought to
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 359. The Court noted:
No question is raised by the government concerning the validity of the literacy test
provided for in the amendment under consideration as an independent standard
since the conclusion is plain that that test rests on the exercise of state judgment,
and therefore cannot be here assailed either by disregarding the State’s power to
judge on the subject, or by testing its motive in enacting the provision.

Id. at 360.
49. Brief for the United States at 16, Guinn, 238 U.S. 347 (No. 423) (“If the amendment
had ended with the first sentence, thereby denying the right to vote to any persons unable to read
and write any sections of the State constitution, there would be no question as to its validity.”).
50. Guinn, 238 U.S. at 362.
51. Id. at 366.
52. Id. at 359–60 (noting that the United States denied the right “to review or supervise”
the state’s right to enforce a literacy requirement).
53. Morgan Kousser reads the Court’s decision in Guinn not as protective of black voters,
but as a mechanism for maintaining white supremacy. Kousser argues that if Justice White wanted
to support black political equality, he needed to have overturned Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475
(1903). See KOUSSER, supra note 34, at 473 n.32 (“Invalidating the grandfather clause
enfranchised no blacks, because that patently unconstitutional device merely allowed illiterate
whites to register legally. Throwing out Giles, however, would have allowed blacks to vote, since
Giles was a challenge to the administration of the Alabama Constitution. A former member of the
‘conservative’ faction of the Democratic Party in Louisiana, which had opposed the grandfather
clause in that state’s constitutional convention in 1898, White wished to rule that escape clause
unconstitutional, but he did not want to endanger white Democratic supremacy in the South.”).
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enforce a literacy test because literacy tests did not violate the Fifteenth
Amendment.
The Court confirmed Guinn’s baseline almost 45 years later in Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Elections, where the Court upheld North
Carolina’s literacy requirement under the Fourteenth and Seventeenth
Amendments.54 Noting that the Guinn Court had resolved the
constitutionality of literacy tests “in a few words,”55 the Court’s opinion in
Lassiter was only slightly more verbose. Justice Douglas, writing for a
unanimous Court, stated that “[t]he states have long been held to have broad
powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be
exercised.”56 The Court conceded that the powers of the states are subject to
constitutional limits and to “any restriction that Congress acting pursuant to
its constitutional powers [may] impose[].”57 But literacy tests did not violate
the Constitution because “[l]iteracy and illiteracy are neutral on race, creed,
color, and sex.58 Thus, it followed that Congress lacked the power to prohibit
the states from enacting a literacy test.
Less than ten years later and after the VRA became law, the plaintiffs in
Katzenbach v. Morgan took the same position. They argued that New York
could enforce the portion of its election statute that required voters to be able
to read and write English, notwithstanding section 4(e) of the VRA.59 Section
4(e) of the VRA prohibits states from denying otherwise qualified individuals
the right to vote; it therefore precluded New York from enforcing its Englishliteracy rule. Under the constitutional baseline set by Guinn and confirmed
by Lassiter, the plaintiffs and the State of New York should have won the case
rather easily. The argument is fairly straightforward. States set the
qualifications for voting, and neither the federal government nor the
Supreme Court can interfere with a state’s chosen voting qualifications unless
that state discriminates on the basis of some protected category, such as race.
A facially neutral English-literacy requirement is a per se constitutionally valid
qualification that is like “[r]esidence requirements, age, previous criminal
record,”60 and the literacy tests upheld in Guinn and Lassiter that the Court
had found to be within the core function of state governments. Given that the
Supreme Court had previously found literacy requirements to be per se
constitutional, there was no basis for Congress to prohibit the states from such
enactments as it did in section 4(e). This was the argument that New York
advanced—and lost—in Morgan.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1959).
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966).
Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51 (citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345–47 (1890)).
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Though the Court in Morgan chanted the received mantra that states
establish qualifications for voting and that the only constraint on this power
of the states is the Constitution, the Court was interested in a completely
different inquiry. The question, the Court stated, was not whether the Court’s
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment precluded New York from
promulgating its statute; rather, the question was whether Congress had the
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to make its own
independent determination that the state statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.61 In addition, the Court considered whether Congress’s
judgment that the State violated the Fourteenth Amendment ought to receive
great deference from the judiciary.62 Notwithstanding the concern about the
“federalism costs” of the VRA that would preoccupy the Court in the future,63
the majority in Morgan was willing to defer significantly to Congress’s
determination that certain state electoral statutes were inconsistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment. “It was well within congressional authority to say that
this need of the Puerto Rican minority for the vote warranted federal
intrusion upon any state interests served by the English literacy
requirement.”64 Thus, the federalism baseline was moved to the federal
government, and its precise location was left to Congress.
Morgan represents how the VRA is a paradigm-shifting statute in three
key ways. First, according to the Court in Morgan, Congress is an independent
interpreter of the Constitution that need neither wait for the Court to first
determine that a state practice has violated the Constitution nor agree with
the Court that a state practice does not violate the Constitution before
Congress can regulate that state practice. Second, even where the Court
disagrees with Congress’s interpretation, the Court will provide a fair amount
of deference to Congress’s interpretation of what state action violates the
Fourteenth Amendment. Third, Morgan moved the federalism baseline in
favor of the federal government and against the states. While the Court in
Guinn placed voting qualifications within the set of core state functions that

61. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649 (“Without regard to whether the judiciary would find that
the Equal Protection Clause itself nullifies New York’s English literacy requirement as so applied,
could Congress prohibit the enforcement of the state law by legislating under [section] 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment?”). In this vein, compare Morgan with the Court’s recent decision in
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013) (holding that a state proof
of citizenship requirement was pre-empted by federal law).
62. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653.
63. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009).
“These federalism costs have caused Members of this Court to express serious misgivings about
the constitutionality of [section] 5.” Id. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
358–62 (1966)). We discuss the nature of these costs elsewhere. See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles
& Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s Rights, Last Rites, and Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481 (2014);
Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race, Federalism, and Voting Rights, 2015 CHI. LEGAL
F. (forthcoming).
64. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653.
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cannot be regulated by Congress or second-guessed by the federal courts, the
Court in Morgan took a different approach. The Morgan Court created room
for Congress to determine when it, as opposed to the courts, ought to
supervise the states when they enact electoral laws.
The Morgan Court understood that it was not interpreting any ordinary
statute. Notwithstanding the Court’s prior precedents and prior
understanding of the constitutional baselines, the Court molded the prior
precedents and moved the constitutional baselines in favor of the VRA
because of its magnitude. The Court understood that the VRA was not just an
important and effective statute with deep historical significance. Rather, the
Court understood the VRA for what it was, a landmark statute promulgated
to resolve a fundamental public policy problem. The VRA gave effect to a
constitutional command, and it exerted an expressive and interpretive
influence beyond its narrow terms. As we will show later, the Court’s approach
in Shelby County is significantly different from its approach to the VRA in
Morgan.
B. COOPERATION
The second way a statute is eligible for super status is based on the extent
that effective implementation of the statute’s public policy aims obliges
extensive partnership or cooperation between at least two of the three
branches. Cooperation is compelled by the fact that the public policy question
is sufficiently important, complex, intractable, or contested so that the various
branches of government must work together—as more or less equal
partners—to find and implement solutions.65 This is an institutional account
of cooperation and statutory interpretation.
In giving effect to the policy aims of a superstatute, the branches view one
another as partners in a joint enterprise. They are not operating from a formal
separation-of-powers perspective but from a fluid integration-of-powers
mindset. Each branch is self-consciously lending its institutional expertise and
prestige in concert with the coordinate branches to address a relevant public
policy problem. Note that cooperation has a telos, which is to effectuate the
aims of the statute broadly conceived.66
The examples we offer below underscore the importance that our
account places on the concept of cooperation. This is the condition that
elevates ordinary legislation to super status. In the first Subpart, we contrast

65. Cooperation may be compelled because the statute’s great mission convinces the
coordinate branches that cooperation is worthwhile, or the branches are ideologically committed
to the aim of the statute. It may also be the case that cooperation is compelled because of political
constraints. But the underlying point here is that the coordinate branches are willing to partner
with Congress to effectuate the purposes of the statute or resolve the pressing public policy
problem addressed by the statute.
66. Importantly, as we will argue later, this telos provides a basis for judging the efficacy of
superstatutory interpretation.
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the Court’s handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 with the Court’s more
recent handling of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.67 This discussion makes
clear why the 1875 Act never reached super status and the 1965 Act did. The
second Subpart illustrates that the Court need not partner only with Congress
but may also partner with the executive branch. The common thread that ties
all superstatutes together is the willingness on the part of one of the
coordinate branches to allow and sometimes invite the other branches to
contribute their understanding of the statute and create a collective
understanding of the scope and meaning of the statute. Our discussion of the
VRA makes clear the Court’s willingness to cooperate with the political
branches in providing content to the VRA, thereby fulfilling the interbranch
cooperation element and making the VRA a superstatute.
1. Cooperation as Deference to Congress
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 could have been a superstatute. It was
certainly a landmark statute.68 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to
protect the right of “all persons . . . to the full and equal enjoyment of the
accommodations . . . of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters,
and other places of public amusement” regardless of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.69 Similar to the VRA, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was
meant to give effect to the Reconstruction Amendments, specifically the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The 1875 Act would have removed
the de facto mark of slavery that remained even after emancipation and which
stained every public interaction between a black citizen and a white merchant.
The Act would have afforded citizens the dignity of equal treatment whenever
they sought a public accommodation.70 Moreover, the 1875 Act did not stand
alone. Enacted on the heels of the bold, but constitutionally vulnerable, Civil
Rights Act of 1866, the 1875 Act was the latest precarious stepping stone
toward a path to full equality for previously bonded servants. The statute was
pregnant with possibilities.
But those possibilities required the cooperation of at least one coordinate
branch—in this case, the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the 1875 Act’s
possibilities as a superstatute were abruptly curtailed in the Civil Rights Cases.
The Court took a dim view of Congress’s authority to pass the Act and held
that Congress did not have the power either under the Fourteenth
Amendment or under the Thirteenth Amendment to outlaw private
discrimination, even with respect to public accommodations.
67. Compare The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13–14 (1883) (displaying the Court’s
uncooperative posture toward the Civil Rights Act of 1875), with Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308
(suggesting the Court’s more cooperative posture toward the VRA).
68. See ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1863–1877, at 234–35 (1990).
69. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335, 336.
70. See Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 561, 625–26 (2012).
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Justice Bradley’s opinion for the Court was an exercise in judicial
formalism based upon strict conceptions of separation of powers and
federalism. The theory was quite simple: Congress enacts statutes and the
Court examines their constitutionality.71 The Court is agnostic about the
statute’s aims, but strictly polices the constitutional boundaries.72 Following
this view, the majority explained that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
grant Congress general police powers and “d[id] not invest Congress with
power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State
legislation.”73 Instead, the Constitution drew clear lines between public rights
and private rights, between state action and private action, and between
corrective legislation and primary legislation.74
This discussion led Justice Bradley to conclude that the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 was not properly enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment because
the Act regulated private behavior.75 He reached this conclusion by way of the
now-familiar argument that the Fourteenth Amendment only addressed state
action, while the 1875 Act sought to reach private action. Similarly, because,
in Justice Bradley’s words, “the act of a mere individual, the owner of the inn,
the public conveyance, or place of amusement, refusing the accommodation,
[cannot] be justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude
upon the applicant,” Congress did not properly enact the Act under the
Thirteenth Amendment, even though the Thirteenth Amendment applies to
private action.76 In concluding the opinion, Justice Bradley and the Court
could not help but offer this final piece de resistance that makes explicit their
defection from the underlying aim of the Act:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he
takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite
of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be
protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are
protected.77
The Court thereby prevented the Civil Rights Act of 1875 from becoming a
superstatute by opting for judicial formalism over cooperation with the
political branches.78

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10.
See id. at 18–19.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
For a defense of the Court, see generally PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION (2011).
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By contrast, the Court could not have been more sympathetic to the aims
of the VRA and could not have signaled more its willingness to cooperate with
Congress than it did in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. For Chief Justice Warren,
who penned the majority opinion in Katzenbach, the constitutionality of the
VRA was not to be decided on the basis of a formalistic and rigid
understanding of both the statute and the Constitution, but “with reference
to the historical experience which it reflects.”79 The Court clearly viewed
Congress as a partner in resolving the problem of racial discrimination in
voting that had plagued (and notice the personalization of the problem) “our
country for nearly a century.”80 With respect to the powers of Congress, this
time under the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court was unequivocal:
The language and purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment, the prior
decisions construing its several provisions, and the general doctrines
of constitutional interpretation, all point to one fundamental
principle. As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may
use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition
of racial discrimination in voting.81
The Court explicitly rejected “any . . . artificial rules” that would
“circumscribe[]” the powers of Congress.82 Contrary to the Court’s approach
in the Civil Rights Cases, an approach that dissented from and refused to
cooperate with the vision of racial equality put forward by Congress in the
Civil Rights Act of 1857, Chief Justice Warren and the majority in Katzenbach
explicitly embraced the aims of the VRA and constitutionalized that vision,
quoting the Fifteenth Amendment:
We here hold that the portions of the Voting Rights Act properly
before us are a valid means for carrying out the commands of the
Fifteenth Amendment. Hopefully, millions of non-white Americans
will now be able to participate for the first time on an equal basis in
the government under which they live. We may finally look forward
to the day when truly “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”83
South Carolina v. Katzenbach is of a piece with Katzenbach v. Morgan, both
of which were decided in the same term. Recall that, notwithstanding the fact
the Court in Lassiter held that literacy tests were constitutional, the Morgan
Court upheld a provision of the VRA that outlawed literacy tests.84 Morgan

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 324.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 337 (alteration in original).
See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text.

A2_CHARLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/13/2015 2:11 PM

THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN WINTER

1407

clearly depended upon a partnership and an aggregation-of-powers
framework and not a principal–agent separation-of-powers framework. The
Court, therefore, was creating the constitutional space necessary to enable
Congress to resolve what the Court recognized as a difficult and pressing
problem. In a move that turned the separation-of-powers and the principal–
agent model on its head, the Court deferred to Congress’s vision of
constitutional equality, notwithstanding the fact that that vision contradicted
and displaced the Court’s previously articulated understanding of
constitutional equality. This is a common move in the VRA cases. When the
Court analyzes the VRA, its deference to Congress is evidence of the
interbranch cooperation that befits a superstatute.
2. Cooperation as Deference to the Executive Branch
In interpreting superstatutes—and the VRA specifically—the Court’s
deference and cooperation is not limited to Congress. It also extends to the
executive branch. Consider the case of Georgia v. United States. There, the State
of Georgia objected, inter alia, to the administrative regulations the Attorney
General promulgated in implementing the VRA.85 In particular, Georgia
argued that the Attorney General did not have the authority to adopt
regulations that shifted the burden of proving that a proposed change was
enacted without a discriminatory purpose or effect to covered jurisdictions.86
The Attorney General objected to Georgia’s legislative reapportionment plan
because he was “unable to conclude that the plan does not have a
discriminatory racial effect on voting.”87 Georgia contended that the Attorney
General could not object on that basis. Georgia argued that the Attorney
General had to first conclude that the plan had a racially discriminatory
purpose or effect before refusing to preclear it.88
The Court disagreed. Though it acknowledged the fact “that [section] 5
itself does not authorize the Attorney General to promulgate any regulations,”
it nevertheless concluded that the regulations were permissible.89 The critical
inquiry for the Court was whether the regulations adopted by the Attorney
General were reasonable, the most deferential standard of review. Finding
that the regulations were reasonable, the Court applauded the Attorney
General’s regulations as “lawful and effective.”90
Note the Morgan-like radicalness of the Court’s decision in Georgia, a
radicalness that the sands of time should not obscure. From a federalism
perspective, it is one thing for Congress to shift the burden of proof to the

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 531 (1973).
Id.
Id. at 530 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 531.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 539.
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covered jurisdictions when those jurisdictions are instituting a declaratory
judgment action in federal court. It is another thing altogether for the Attorney
General, on his own, to shift the burden of proof to the covered jurisdictions
and for the Court to defer to this unilateral act. Justice White hinted at this
problem in his dissenting opinion:
Although the constitutionality of [section] 5 has long since been
upheld, it remains a serious matter that a sovereign State must
submit its legislation to federal authorities before it may take effect.
It is even more serious to insist that it initiate litigation and carry the
burden of proof as to constitutionality simply because the State has
employed a particular test or device and a sufficiently low percentage
of its citizens has voted in its elections. And why should the State be
forced to shoulder that burden where its proposed change is so
colorless that the country’s highest legal officer professes his
inability to make up his mind as to its legality? If he is to object, must
he not himself conclude that the proposed change will have the
forbidden purpose or effect?91
Georgia became one of the most important, if not the most important,
legal authorities available to the Attorney General in interpreting the VRA. It
enabled the DOJ to hold a Damoclean sword over the covered jurisdictions.
The DOJ cited the case in almost every objection letter that it sent to
submitting parties as a reminder of its authority, now supported not just by its
regulations, but also by the authority of the Supreme Court.92
In addition, Georgia was an important case because the Court showed a
willingness to defer to the Attorney General not only with respect to
administrative regulations, but also with respect to the Attorney General’s
substantive interpretation of the Act itself. Most importantly for our purposes,
however, is the fact that Georgia was not an outlier. Four years later, in United
States v. Sheffield Board of Commissioners, the Court decided whether section 5
preclearance applied to the City of Sheffield, a political unit within the
covered State of Alabama.93 The statutory language could not be any clearer:
only states and political subdivisions are subject to section 5, and political
subdivisions are counties or parishes, or else jurisdictions that conduct voter
registration.94 Sheffield was not a political entity that conducted voter

91. Id. at 543–44 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also id. at 545 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (“As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General
should be required to comply with it explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is able
to make an affirmative finding rather than an ambivalent one.”).
92. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Preclearance, Discrimination, and the
Department of Justice: The Case of South Carolina, 57 S.C. L. REV. 827, 857–58 (2006).
93. United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 113 (1978).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (2012) (“The term ‘political subdivision’ shall mean any
county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision

A2_CHARLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN WINTER

4/13/2015 2:11 PM

1409

registration. Therefore, the city argued that, according to the clear language
of the statute, it was not required to preclear its proposed changes.
In response, the Court once again looked to the Attorney General:
What is perhaps a more compelling argument concerning the
original, and subsequent, congressional understanding of the scope
of [section] 5 is that the Attorney General has, since the Act was
adopted in 1965, interpreted [section] 5 as requiring all political
units in designated jurisdictions to preclear proposed voting
changes. . . . In recognition of the Attorney General’s key role in the
formulation of the Act, this Court in the past has given great
deference to his interpretations of it.95
This was a consistent theme through the years. In Dougherty County Board of
Education v. White, plaintiffs raised a similar issue with respect to the scope of
section 5. Once again, relying upon the Attorney General’s interpretation, the
Court noted that in light of “the central role of the Attorney General in
formulating and implementing [section] 5, [his] interpretation of its scope is
entitled to particular deference.”96 Similarly, in NAACP v. Hampton County
Election Commission, the Court once again invoked the Attorney General’s
interpretations of the VRA as determinative proof of the Act’s meaning. In
that case, the Court decided whether a statute authorizing a school board
election had to be precleared. The Court stated that “[a]ny doubt that these
changes are covered by [section] 5 is resolved by the construction placed
upon the Act by the Attorney General, which is entitled to considerable
deference.”97
A superstatute, then, is landmark legislation that requires the branches
to work as partners in order to effectuate the legislation’s purpose. Under this
definition, the VRA is clearly a superstatute. But to so argue only begins the
inquiry. As the next Part explains, once a statute is identified as a superstatute,
the underappreciated question of superstatutory interpretation immediately
arises.
of a county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts
registration for voting.”).
95. Sheffield Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. at 131.
96. Dougherty Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 39 (1978).
97. NAACP v. Hampton Cnty. Election Comm’n, 470 U.S. 166, 178–79 (1985). Contrast
the Court’s decisions in Dougherty County and Hampton County with its decision ten years later in
Miller v. Johnson, in which the Court excoriated the Department of Justice for, in the Court’s view,
trying to unconstitutionally maximize majority-minority districts. See generally Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995). Unlike in Dougherty County and Hampton County, where the Court viewed
the DOJ as an entity entitled to deference, in Miller the Court viewed the DOJ not as an equal
partner but as a subordinate. See id. at 922 (“We do not accept the contention that the State has
a compelling interest in complying with whatever preclearance mandates the Justice Department
issues. When a state governmental entity seeks to justify race-based remedies to cure the effects
of past discrimination, we do not accept the government’s mere assertion that the remedial action
is required. Rather, we insist on a strong basis in evidence of the harm being remedied.”).
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III. PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATION
Treating the VRA like a superstatute is particularly consequential for the
pragmatic way in which the Court has interpreted the Act over the years. The
Court has interpreted the statute pragmatically both to expand the scope of
the Act generally while also narrowing its scope, especially against the
backdrop of constitutional concerns. The evolution of the Act, in fact, offers
a prototypical example of Ronald Dworkin’s chain-letter analogy. According
to Dworkin, a statutory interpreter “see[s] his own role as fundamentally the
creative one of a partner continuing to develop, in what he believes is the best
way, the statutory scheme Congress began.”98 This Part situates the recent and
largely misunderstood case of Northwest Austin within the chain letter the VRA
created.
A. NORTHWEST AUSTIN AS A CHAIN LETTER
Soon after Congress renewed section 5’s preclearance requirement for
another 25 years in 2006,99 the Northwest Austin Municipal District Number
One (the “District”), a small utility district located in Travis County, Texas,
filed suit challenging Congress’s constitutional power to compel covered
jurisdictions to preclear proposed changes.100 Because the District is located
in Texas, a covered jurisdiction, it had to preclear any changes to votingrelated procedures or practices with the DOJ or the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia before it could implement them.101
Though the District is ultimately responsible for voter registration, it does not
conduct its own elections, which it delegates to Travis County for
administrative reasons.102 The District also argued, on statutory grounds, that
it should be permitted to “bailout” from the preclearance requirement
because it had never engaged in racial discrimination notwithstanding the
fact that it is located in Texas, a covered jurisdiction that has engaged in racial
discrimination in voting.
A three-judge panel at the district court rejected both the constitutional
and the statutory challenges.103 The Supreme Court reversed and concluded

98. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 313 (1986); see also Ronald Dworkin, Law as
Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 541–43 (1982). For an empirical critique of Dworkin’s
argument, see Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel
Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1205 (2005) (discussing the results
of their study, which revealed “that judicial discretion appears to expand with the growth of
additional precedents”).
99. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 §§ 4–5, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b–1973c (2012).
100. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009).
101. Id. at 200.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 201.
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that the District was statutorily eligible for bailout from section 5 coverage.104
Under the clear terms of the statute, only those political subdivisions that
conduct registration for voting are eligible for bailout.105 The lower court in
Northwest Austin found that because the District was not a county or parish and
did not conduct registration for voting, it was not eligible for bailout under
section 4(a).106 It was also the conclusion of most voting rights scholars prior
to the Supreme Court’s decision.107
Yet, the Court understood the statute differently.108 Not one single justice
agreed with the district court despite the clear language of section 14(c)(2).
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts began with the proposition that
“[s]tatutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words, of course, in
the usual case. But this is an unusual case.”109 The District’s case was unusual,
Chief Justice Roberts reasoned, not because the statutory text is ambiguous—
indeed the text is crystal clear—but because “specific precedent, the structure
of the Voting Rights Act, and underlying constitutional concerns compel a
broader reading of the bailout provision.”110 In other words, the fact that the
statutory text is unambiguous is not a sufficient justification to accord the text
its plain meaning. Statutory meaning is not determined by the plain meaning
of an unambiguous text; other considerations trump.
Chief Justice Roberts relied upon two cases to support the proposition
that the text need not determine its interpretation of the statute: United States
v. Sheffield Board of Commissioners and Dougherty County Board of Education v.
White. In order to understand the Court’s statutory interpretation in Northwest
Austin, we must first make sense of these two cases.
In Sheffield, the Alabama city changed its governance structure from a
commission system—in which three commissioners ran city operations—to a

104. Id. at 211. Bailout is governed by section 4 of the VRA. Section 4(a) allows a state or
political subdivision to bailout from coverage if the state or political subdivision obtains a
declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that it
has a record of compliance with the VRA. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2012).
105. By definition, counties or parishes are political subdivisions under the statute; they need
not conduct registration for voting.
106. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 283 (D.D.C.
2008), rev’d sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193.
107. See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court Punts on Section 5, BALKINIZATION (June 22, 2009,
10:42 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/supreme-court-punts-on-section-5.html (“[T]he
statutory argument is one that almost no one (save Greg Coleman, the lawyer who argued the case
and who is now entitled to be described as a mad genius) thought was particularly tenable because
of prior Court opinions.”); Richard L. Hasen, Sordid Business: Will the Supreme Court Kill the Voting
Rights Act?, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2009, 11:59 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2216888/ (“Since there’s
no good statutory loophole, the larger constitutional question seems unavoidable.”).
108. For a discussion and critique, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance
and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181.
109. Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 206–07 (quoting Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S.
198, 201 (1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id. at 207.
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mayor–council system.111 Under the new system, council members would be
elected at large.112 The Attorney General objected to the new means of
election and sought a temporary restraining order against the City of
Sheffield. Even though the entire state of Alabama was a covered jurisdiction,
Sheffield argued that it was not required to preclear the change because it was
not a political subdivision conducting registration for voting, as defined in
section 14(c)(2).113 The district court agreed.114 Accordingly, the Court
concluded, once section 4 covered a state, section 5 only subjected to the
preclearance requirement those political subdivisions that conducted voter
registration.
This was not an unreasonable understanding of the statutory scheme and
the concerns that guided the 89th Congress. Looking to the facts at hand in
1965, Congress was clearly concerned with access to the ballot for voters of
color. Registration thus stood at the heart of the VRA. Consequently, only
those subdivisions entrusted with registration authority would be subject to
the coverage and preclearance provisions.
The Supreme Court disagreed with this reading of the statute. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, maintained that the lower court’s
conclusion was “inconsistent” with the structure of the Act and the purpose
of the law.115 He grounded his holding in an anti-circumvention rationale. To
read the statute as the district court read it would permit covered states to
defeat the purpose of the statute by devolving political power to local
authorities and empowering them to “take steps that would, temporarily at
least, dilute or entirely defeat the voting rights of minorities.”116 Covered
states could “circumvent the Act . . . by allowing local entities that do not
conduct voter registration to control critical aspects of the electoral
process.”117 This would undermine the very purpose and structure of the Act,
a chief aim of which was to prevent local officials from staying one step ahead
of regulators. In the Court’s words, “[t]he clear consequence of this
interpretation would be to nullify both [section] 5 and the Act in a large
number of its potential applications.”118 This was the reason that section 5
attempted to freeze all “procedure[s] with respect to voting” until they were
precleared.119

111. United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 114–15 (1978).
112. Id. at 115.
113. Id. at 116.
114. See United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm’rs, 430 F. Supp. 786, 789 (N.D. Ala. 1976),
rev’d, 435 U.S. 110 (1978) (“This Court is of the opinion that the City of Sheffield is not covered
by the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”).
115. Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 117–18.
116. Id. at 124.
117. Id. at 125.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 122.
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Justice Brennan’s argument had much to commend it but for one
obvious fact: the clear language of the Act appeared to pose an
insurmountable obstacle. Only political units that registered voters were
subject to section 5, and the City of Sheffield clearly did not register anyone.
According to Justice Brennan, however, section 14(c)(2) did not have any
bearing on and was, in fact, irrelevant to understanding the scope of section
5.120 To his mind, the legislative history of section 14(c)(2) made clear that
this statutory definition was only applicable to areas outside covered states.121
In other words, once a state has been designated for coverage, section
14(c)(2) “has no operative significance in determining the reach of [section]
5 . . . .”122 Section 14(c)(2) is inapplicable when the question is whether a
non-designated political unit in a covered state is required to preclear changes
related to voting. For Justice Brennan and the majority, “the legislative history
[left] no doubt but that it is in this sense that Congress used the term.”123
The Court endorsed Sheffield’s anti-circumvention rationale in Dougherty
County Board of Education v. White.124 The Dougherty County Board of
Education, a political unit within the State of Georgia—a covered state—
adopted a rule that required any employee seeking political office to take a
leave of absence without pay.125 As it happened, the County adopted the rule
after the plaintiff, an African-American employee of the school board,
announced his candidacy for the Georgia House of Representatives. The
plaintiff ultimately filed suit on the ground that the school board failed to
preclear the rule, in violation of section 5 of the Act.126 As a subdivision
located in a covered jurisdiction, the plaintiff argued, changes related to
voting required preclearance.127 The school board argued, inter alia, that it
was not a covered jurisdiction as that term was defined under section
14(c)(2)—it was not a county or parish, and it did not register voters.128
The Supreme Court disagreed with the school board. Writing for the
majority and echoing the Court’s opinion in Sheffield, Justice Marshall
explained that “[section] 5 requires preclearance whenever a political
subdivision within a covered State adopts a change in a standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting. No requirement that the subdivision itself

120. See id. at 126–27.
121. See id. at 128 (“The legislative background of [section] 14(c)(2)’s definition of ‘political
subdivision’ reflects that Congress intended to define [the term] ‘political subdivision’ as areas
of a nondesignated State.”).
122. Id. at 126; see also id. at 127 (“But it is clear that once a State is designated for coverage
the Act’s remedial provisions apply to actions that are not formally those of the State.”).
123. Id. at 128 n.15.
124. See Dougherty Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1978).
125. Id. at 34.
126. Id. at 35.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 43–44.
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conduct elections is stated in [section] 5 and none is fairly implied.”129 Justice
Marshall rested his holding on Sheffield’s anti-circumvention rationale. He
noted that a contrary decision “would enable covered jurisdictions to
circumvent the Act by delegating power over candidate qualification to local
entities that do not conduct elections or voter registration.”130 This is a result
that “Sheffield sought to avert.”131
From a doctrinal standpoint, we could argue quite persuasively that
Sheffield and Dougherty County were inapposite and distinguishable from
Northwest Austin. First, these are preclearance cases and not bailout cases.132
They are directed toward a different set of concerns than those addressed by
the Court in Northwest Austin.
Second, the Court’s opinions in Sheffield and Dougherty County were
justified by an anti-circumvention rationale that is not present in Northwest
Austin. Sheffield and Dougherty County are VRA-enhancing cases. The Court’s
worry in both cases was that state and local jurisdictions would collude to
circumvent the applicability of the VRA. Congress’s concern with the ability
of local officials to stay one step ahead of regulation was the reason for the
elaborate mechanisms of the VRA in the first place.133 The Court’s statutory
interpretation in Sheffield and Dougherty County intended to strengthen and
expand the reach of the VRA. In contrast, Northwest Austin is a VRA-limiting
case. Its statutory interpretation is intended to restrict the scope of the VRA.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, in Northwest Austin, a clear and
unambiguous text applied to the problem before the Court. Section 14(c)(2)
was squarely on point. This was not the case in Sheffield and Dougherty County.
One could argue that the Court in those two cases was choosing between two
equally applicable interpretations of the statutory text. Consequently, the
Court’s interpretation of the statutory text in both cases did less violence to
that text than the Court’s interpretation in Northwest Austin.
But to focus on these putative doctrinal inconsistencies would be to miss
the Court’s larger lesson in Northwest Austin. The Chief Justice’s larger point
is that when it comes to the VRA, the text is, at best, a jumping-off point for
making voting rights policy. Given that the Court has never allowed the plain
meaning of an unambiguous text to cabin its interpretation, the Chief Justice
129. Id. at 45.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 168–69 (1980) (considering the
legislative intent behind the bailout provision and concluding that the City could not seek bailout).
133. Indeed, even Justice Powell, who raised significant questions with respect to the
constitutionality of the Act in Allen v. State Board of Elections, concurred in Sheffield on the ground
that the decision was “necessary in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act” because a contrary
holding would enable a covered State or political subdivision to “achieve through its
instrumentalities what it could not do itself without preclearance.” United States v. Sheffield Bd.
of Comm’rs, 439 U.S. 110, 139 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). Though Justice Powell went on to
dissent in Dougherty County, Justice Marshall picked up Justice Stevens’s vote, a dissenter in Sheffield.
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reasoned in Northwest Austin, why start now? This has been true from the
moment the Court first considered the substantive meaning of the VRA. This
was Allen v. State Board of Elections.134
B. THE BEGINNING: ALLEN
Allen is well-known for the Court’s substantive interpretation of the
VRA.135 It is less well-known for the Court’s interpretation of a number of
preliminary jurisdictional issues, which are at least as consequential as the
substantive questions. First, the Court needed to determine whether private
plaintiffs were entitled to bring enforcement actions under section 5. Second,
the Court had to address whether all lawsuits under section 5 must be brought
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Third, the
Court was compelled to resolve whether three-judge courts should hear
lawsuits under section 5. The future effectiveness of the Act hung in the
balance.
1. The Act and Private Attorneys General
The Court’s first statutory question was whether the VRA authorized
private plaintiffs to seek a declaration that a state has implemented a change
related to voting without first preclearing the change, as required by section
5. As a textual matter, the plaintiffs could not argue that the VRA permitted
them to act as private attorneys general. No provision in the text of the VRA
authorizes private plaintiffs to file enforcement actions. At best one could say
that the text was silent. Moreover, if one examined the statutory scheme
holistically, the best answer was that the VRA delegated the exclusive authority
to public officials, and specifically the DOJ, to bring enforcement actions.
In an expansive interpretation of the statute, the Court ruled otherwise.
Acknowledging that the question could not be resolved textually, the Court
found refuge in pragmatic considerations and the purpose of the Act.136
Citing its landmark opinion in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court
concluded that the Act’s major purpose was “to make the guarantees of the
Fifteenth Amendment finally a reality for all citizens.”137 The guarantee of
racial equality, the Court noted, was explicitly provided by section 5. To
depend solely on the Attorney General and her discretion in enforcing

134. The Court had concluded in South Carolina v. Katzenbach that the Act was constitutional,
but it was not until Allen that the Court first interpreted the Act. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544, 548 (1969).
135. See, e.g., ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 22–24 (1987).
136. Allen, 393 U.S. at 554–55 (“The Voting Rights Act does not explicitly grant or deny
private parties authorization to seek a declaratory judgment that a State has failed to comply with
the provisions of the Act.”).
137. Id. at 556.
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section 5 of the Act, however, could hamper this goal.138 This was because the
Attorney General, with her limited staff, could not be expected to uncover the
many voting changes that took place at all levels of government.139
Consequently, the Court concluded that “[i]t [was] consistent with the broad
purpose of the Act to allow the individual citizen standing to insure that his
city or county government complies with the [section] 5 approval
requirements.”140 Pragmatic considerations trumped a textual analysis.
2. Private Attorneys General and Local Federal Courts
The Court then turned to the second statutory interpretation question,
which was premised upon the first: if private plaintiffs could file section 5
enforcement actions, could they file these actions in the local district court?
Or else, must these actions be filed in the District Court for the District of
Columbia? Unlike the first question, where the text was silent, here the text
of the Act appeared to offer a clear answer. Section 14(b) provided that “[n]o
court other than the District Court for the District of Columbia shall have
jurisdiction to issue any declaratory judgment pursuant to section [4] or
[5] . . . or any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction against
the execution or enforcement of any provision of [this Act].”141 This was as
clear and definitive an answer for exclusive jurisdiction of enforcement
actions under section 5 as Congress could draft. Or so it appeared.
The problem for the Court was this: if the Court was right that private
attorneys general were crucial in enforcing the Act’s guarantees, could these
individuals be expected to bring these claims in the District Court for the
District of Columbia, as opposed to the local federal district courts where the
potential plaintiffs resided? The answer was clearly no. If private attorney
generals were crucial to the enforcement of the Act, then forcing them to file
suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia was counter to that
objective. Chief Justice Warren and the majority in Allen appreciated this
dilemma. But the issue was how to deal with the clear statutory language.
According to the Court, section 14(b) cannot be read in isolation.142 It
was true that section 14(b) granted exclusive jurisdiction to the District Court
for the District of Columbia.143 But this jurisdiction was for a particular
138. Id. (explaining that this “laudable goal could be severely hampered . . . if each citizen
were required to depend solely on litigation instituted at the discretion of the Attorney General”).
139. Id. (“The Attorney General has a limited staff and often might be unable to uncover
quickly new regulations and enactments passed at the varying levels of state government.”).
140. Id. at 557. “The guarantee of [section] 5 that no person shall be denied the right to vote
for failure to comply with an unapproved new enactment subject to [section] 5, might well prove
an empty promise unless the private citizen were allowed to seek judicial enforcement of the
prohibition.” Id. The Court also noted that allowing a private cause of action under section 5 is
consistent with past practice and precedent. Id.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(b) (2012).
142. Allen, 393 U.S. at 558.
143. Id. at 557–58.
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purpose: to entertain suits “against the execution or enforcement of any
provision of [this Act].”144 These suits would, of necessity, involve a
constitutional attack on the Act.145 As such, they must be heard by the District
Court for the District of Columbia.
In contrast, section 12(d) of the Act authorizes the Attorney General to
seek an injunction, among other remedies, against anyone who has violated
or is about to violate the Act.146 In turn, section 12(f) provided federal district
courts with jurisdiction over suits instituted under section 12(d).147 To be
sure, section 12(d) and (f) were grants of power to the Attorney General. To
the Court, however, the crucial fact was “that [section] 12(f) . . . [wa]s aimed
at prohibiting the enforcement of a state enactment that is for some reason
violative of the Act.”148
The same reasoning applied when considering declaratory judgment
suits, the Court found.149 Congress must have provided exclusive jurisdiction
to the District Court for the District of Columbia to hear what it termed
“substantive discrimination” questions and concomitant constitutional
challenges from plaintiffs, who are likely to be state officials hostile to the
enforcement of the VRA.150 Conversely, universal jurisdiction was available to
plaintiffs, who are likely to be voters of color, when they are trying to institute
coverage suits against hostile state statutes or regulations.151
To the Court, policy considerations strongly counseled for its preferred
view:
Requiring that declaratory judgment actions be brought in the
District of Columbia places a burden on the plaintiff. . . . Admittedly,
it would be easier for States to bring [section] 5 actions in the district
courts in their own States. However, the State has sufficient
resources to prosecute the actions easily in the Nation’s Capital . . . .
On the other hand, the individual litigant will often not have
sufficient resources to maintain an action easily outside the district
in which he resides, especially in cases where the individual litigant
is attacking a local city or county regulation. Thus, for the individual
litigant, the District of Columbia burden may be sufficient to
preclude him from bringing suit.152

144. Id. at 558 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(b) (Supp. I 1964)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
145. Id.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d) (2012).
147. Id. § 1973j(f).
148. Allen, 393 U.S. at 558.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 558–59.
151. See id. at 559–60.
152. Id.
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The Court concluded that the plaintiffs could file suit in their local
federal district court because section 14(b) applied only to declaratory
judgment actions brought by a state and not to a declaratory judgment action
brought by private litigants.153 And once again, the Court preferred pragmatic
considerations despite seemingly contrary statutory language.
3. Local Three-Judge Courts
The third jurisdictional statutory interpretation question was whether
three-judge panels should hear lawsuits filed by private litigants. While the Act
clearly provided for three-judge panels to hear lawsuits brought by the state
or by the U.S. Attorney General, the Act did not address the availability of
three-judge panels for suits brought by private litigants. Unsurprisingly, the
VRA was silent on the issue as the VRA did not specifically authorize private
litigants to bring suit under the Act in the first place.
Having authorized private causes of action, the Court’s decision on threejudge panels was almost preordained. Drawing on the legislative justification
for permitting three-judge panels in the types of cases the statute specifically
contemplated, the Court noted that “Congress has determined that threejudge courts are desirable in a number of circumstances involving
confrontations between state and federal power or in circumstances involving
a potential for substantial interference with government administration.”154
According to the Court, the VRA fits within this general purpose. In the VRA,
“[t]he clash between federal and state power and the potential disruption to
state government are apparent.”155 This clash is no less significant when the
lawsuit is filed by private individuals because “the potential for disruption of
state election procedures remains.”156 Consequently, the Court “conclude[d]
that in light of the extraordinary nature of the Act in general, and the unique
approval requirements of [section] 5, Congress intended” to provide for the
availability of three-judge panels to adjudicate section 5 coverage disputes.157

153. Id. at 559. Section 12(f), which the Court used as the textual hook for finding a right to
a private enforcement action, is clearly a particularized exception to section 14(b)’s requirement
that only “the District Court for the District of Columbia . . . ha[s] jurisdiction to issue any
declaratory judgment pursuant to section [2] or [5].” 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(b) (2012). Section 12(d)
authorizes the Attorney General to file suit “[w]henever any person has engaged or there are
reasonable grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any act or practice prohibited
by [the VRA].” Id. § 1973j(d). Similarly, section 12(e) authorizes the Attorney General to file suit
when federal-election examiners notify the Attorney General that eligible voters were not allowed
to vote. Id. § 1973j(e). Thus, when section 12(f) explicitly refers to “proceedings instituted
pursuant to this section,” the context for that reference is not a general grant of jurisdiction to
the federal courts, but a grant of jurisdiction to address specifically the provisions of section 12.
Id. § 1973j(f).
154. Allen, 393 U.S. at 562.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 563.
157. Id.
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And facing yet another issue on which the Act was silent, the Court again
provided a pragmatic interpretation.
***
Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion in Northwest Austin—that the Court has
often departed from the text of the VRA to effectuate what the Court believes
is a proper policy outcome—is supported by our analysis of Allen. In Allen, the
Court, in effect, amended the VRA to provide for private enforcement actions.
It then determined which court would have jurisdiction of those actions. Next,
it concluded that those actions were best heard by three-judge panels with
direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Fundamentally, none of those policy
judgments were dictated or supported by the text of the VRA. Note that these
were the preliminary jurisdictional interpretations of the statute in Allen. For
many, the more radical statutory judgments in Allen are the Court’s
substantive interpretation of the statute.158
When one examines Northwest Austin, Allen, and the vast majority of
voting rights cases, it is clear that the Court approaches its interpretation of
the VRA differently than it does other statutes. Underlying Chief Justice
Roberts’s statutory reasoning is the assumption that the VRA is not ordinary
legislation. The Court has often departed from the text of the VRA, even
where the text is clear, to give effect to what it believes are the underlying
public policy values that should determine the role of race in electoral
politics.159 The Court has felt free to take liberties with the text of the statute
that it would not take with an ordinary statute. Statutory interpretation in the
context of the VRA exhibits an interpretive elasticity that functionally amends
the statute to comport with the Court’s understanding of the statute’s proper
policy aims.160 The Court has used its statutory interpretation of the VRA to
fill in significant statutory gaps and to update the VRA so that it responds to
present-day realities.
The scholarly commentary that followed Northwest Austin criticized the
Court’s conclusion. But this is mostly a failure to appreciate the Act’s
evolution and the Court’s pragmatic interpretations of its vague language.
The more interesting inquiry considers the Court’s recent handling of the
Act, and particularly the way that it refused to continue to update the Act in

158. Id. at 566 (concluding that “[t]he legislative history . . . supports the view that Congress
intended to reach any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even
a minor way”).
159. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the Voting Rights Act, 36 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 697, 750–51 (2009).
160. The VRA is not unique; commentators have identified at least one other statute—the
Sherman Antitrust Act—that reflects a similar interpretive elasticity. See Margaret H. Lemos, The
Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405,
462 (2008).
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Shelby County.161 How do we explain, in other words, the looming death of the
VRA, long considered a superstatute? This is the burden of the next Part.
IV. DISSENSUS
Superstatutes are not self-maintaining. They are sustained by a consensus
broadly shared within the polity that their policy aims are worthy of continued
pursuit. To be sure, the consensus that sustains them need not be
incontestable. Like all public policy, there are often dissenting publics whose
task it is to contest and render contestable the majoritarian consensus. But as
long as the consensus with respect to the policy aims of the superstatute holds
across relevant and influential issue publics, the statute will continue to be a
superstatute.
By the same token, superstatutes die when the consensus that sustained
them dissolves. This can happen in one of two ways. One possibility is that the
views of those who have continually disagreed with the policy aims of the
statute prevail in important spheres of influence—whether in legislatures,
courts, or elite public opinion. The statute would be regarded as a mistake,
and there would be a reversal on the merits. In such a case, Congress would
repeal the superstatute or allow it to expire if it contained a sunset provision.
The second means of dissolution arises when crucial publics begin to question
whether the statute remains necessary on the theory that it has accomplished
its public policy aims. This is where we find ourselves with the VRA.
The VRA’s status as a superstatute depended upon a consensus with
respect to the need to eradicate state-sponsored racial discrimination in
voting. The existence of racial discrimination served as a moral justification
for the VRA, supported the interbranch cooperative approach that had
maintained the VRA, and justified the Court’s pragmatic interpretation of the
VRA. As long as the racial discrimination consensus remained, the VRA’s
status as a superstatute endured.
As we argue in this Part, the Court’s decision in Shelby County reflects the
complete dissolution of the racial discrimination consensus. Shelby County is
remarkable not simply because the Court struck down an important provision
of the VRA and neutered another, but also because the Court essentially
declared an end to the racial discrimination consensus. It was this consensus
that had sustained the VRA’s superstatute status.
A. THE END OF THE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CONSENSUS
Few would disagree with the proposition that the VRA was essential to
address the problem of voting discrimination. But there is a profound and
growing disagreement on the current need for and relevance of the VRA for
the politics of the 21st century. Chief Justice Roberts warned in Northwest

161. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013) (“We cannot . . . try our hand
at updating the statute ourselves.”).
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Austin: “Things have changed in the South. Voter turnout and registration
rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees
are rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.”162 On
this evidence, the Chief Justice implicitly asked, what else is left for the
“temporary” section 5 to do? In a sentence that foreshadowed the Court’s
holding in Shelby County, the Chief complained that “[t]he statute’s coverage
formula is based on data that is now more than 35 years old, and there is
considerable evidence that it fails to account for current political
conditions.”163 One can almost hear the Chief Justice explicitly asking the
question that was implicit in his Northwest Austin discourse: was there any
useful purpose to maintaining an outmoded regulatory regime that had
already achieved its public policy aims, especially in light of the purported
“federalism costs” imposed by the statute?
Four years later, writing for the majority in Shelby County, the Chief
reprised the same refrain. “Nearly 50 years later,” he proclaimed
authoritatively, “things have changed dramatically.”164 In particular,
“[b]latantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare.”165
Notwithstanding these changes, “the Act has not eased the restrictions in
[section] 5 or narrowed the scope of the coverage formula in [section] 4(b)
along the way.”166
Note the arresting plethora of adjectives that the Chief Justice deployed
in the opening paragraph of his opinion in Shelby County to depict the
supposedly aberrant nature of the problem and the fact that the Voting Rights
Act was out of the mainstream of congressional action. The adjective
“extraordinary” makes two noteworthy appearances, and both in the first
sentence.167 “Drastic,” materializes in the second sentence.168 “Dramatic”
provides flourish to the third sentence.169 “Strong” anchors the fourth
sentence.170 “Exceptional” is borrowed woodenly from the Court’s landmark
precedent in South Carolina v. Katzenbach to support the fifth sentence.171
“Unprecedented” closes out the paragraph.172
These adjectives encapsulate Chief Justice Roberts’s story about the VRA.
The Chief Justice tells a story where racism in voting was an extraordinary and

162. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009).
163. Id. at 203.
164. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625.
165. Id. (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 202).
166. Id. at 2626.
167. Id. at 2618 (“The Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary measures to
address an extraordinary problem.”).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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unprecedented problem that required extraordinary and strong remedies,
and which resulted in drastic and dramatic departures from constitutional
principles. At the heart of this remedial scheme stood the coverage formula,
which helped Congress target the special provisions of the Act to where they
were most needed. The formula was initially based on registration and
turnout data from the 1964 election cycle and was last updated in 1972.173
And after almost 40 years, the Chief Justice argued, the Act accomplished
what it set out to do.
According to this story, the mission of the VRA has been accomplished
in two ways. First, voters of color are registering to vote, voting, and electing
their representatives of choice at growing rates. Second, racism is waning. To
be sure, the Court noted that “voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts
that.”174 But it concluded that instances of racism were not sufficiently
systematic to justify the coverage formula any longer. Or, as the Chief Justice
made clear in the second paragraph of his opinion for the majority, “[t]here
is no denying, however, that the conditions that originally justified these
measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.”175
Put differently: things have changed, but the VRA has not. Hence, while
the coverage formula met the relevant constitutional test in 1965, it no longer
meets the test today.176 More generally, the Act’s “extraordinary” provisions
no longer “continue to satisfy constitutional requirements.”177 And with that,
the Court declared an end to the racial discrimination consensus, struck down
the coverage formula, neutered the preclearance requirement, and delivered
a mortal blow to the crown jewel of the civil rights movement. Northwest Austin
and Shelby County are only the latest expression of the dissensus that now
envelops the VRA. This is a dissensus that is predictably reflected in the
political process,178 in prior Supreme Court cases,179 and less predictably—
though no less fervently—in academic circles.180

173. See Nw. Austin Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 200 (2009).
174. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619.
175. Id. at 2618.
176. Id. at 2631.
177. Id. at 2619.
178. See S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 2 (2006) (noting that great strides have been made in race
discrimination).
179. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (considering a challenge to a Texas
redistricting plan); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (considering a challenge to a Georgia
redistricting plan); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) (considering a challenge to a
Louisiana redistricting plan); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (considering a challenge to a
North Carolina redistricting plan).
180. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 12; Overton, supra note 7; Richard H. Pildes, The Future
of Voting Rights Policy: From Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741 (2006).
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B. THREE CONCEPTIONS OF DISSENSUS
“Things have changed” is the theme of both Northwest Austin181 and Shelby
County.182 This is due in no small measure to the VRA. As a result, this is where
the dissensus in voting rights law and policy is keenly reflected. It is far from
clear, in other words, exactly what the “things” are that have changed. This
nondescript noun, “things,” subsumes—really conceals—a number of
important inquiries about voting rights policy as the VRA reaches the
midcentury mark. In this Subpart we explore three “things” that have arguably
changed since the VRA was enacted: (1) the ubiquity and evolving conception
of intentional racial discrimination in voting; (2) the internal coherence of
the VRA’s geographical targeting approach; and (3) the extent to which what
was once a race problem is now a partisanship problem. Taken together, these
“things” and the dissensus that envelops them place great stress on the VRA
as the proper guardian of voting rights for the questions of the 21st century.
1. What Is Racial Discrimination?
One of the “things that have changed” is our confidence in the
prevalence and pervasiveness of intentional discrimination by state actors.
The consensus that prevailed over the need to rein in state-sponsored racial
animus in voting has given way to a debate—which one commentator
describes as “a rather sterile exchange”183—over whether we have made
sufficient progress on this front to justify the unwinding of the VRA (as a
matter of public policy) or the Court’s retreat in Shelby County (as a matter of
constitutional law).
Moreover, focus on the noun “discrimination,” and not on the adjective
“racial,” and consider what counts as racial discrimination for modern voting
rights policy? Is it only state action? Racially polarized voting by the
electorate?184 Racist beliefs?185 Voting laws that have a disparate racial
impact?186 Once we have made significant progress on minimizing, though
not eliminating first-order racial exclusion, how else are we to understand
racial discrimination? Until recently, voting rights doctrine did not need to
parse through these niceties. Having witnessed the South turning hoses on

181. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009) (“Things have
changed in the South.”).
182. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (“Nearly 50 years later, things have changed
dramatically.”).
183. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 99.
184. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Race, Region, and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election:
Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1385 (2010); Stephen
Ansolabehere et al., Regional Differences in Racial Polarization in the 2012 Presidential Election:
Implications for the Constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 205 (2013).
185. See, e.g., Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 7.
186. See, e.g., Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643 (2006).
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black citizens attempting to exercise their fundamental rights, we understood
discrimination, as the Katzenbach Court said, as “an insidious and pervasive evil
which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through
unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”187 But as voting
rights lawyers and scholars begin to think of a response to Shelby County, they
will need to provide a compelling account of what constitutes racial
discrimination in voting in the 21st century. These types of inquiries are
inevitable, and we do not have any consensus or obvious path forward.
2. Does Geographical Targeting Remain Sensible?
A less sterile candidate for the “things that have changed” category is
section 4(b)’s justification for targeting specific states and local jurisdictions
for regulatory scrutiny, which resulted in the subjection of almost all of the
southern states to the preclearance requirement. Recall here the Chief
Justice’s question to the Solicitor General during the oral arguments in Shelby
County: “Is it the government’s submission that the citizens in the South are
more racist than the citizens of the North?”188 Maybe.189 But this question is a
red herring and a tendentious debater’s trick. The real question for voting
rights law and policy in the 21st century is not whether the South is more
racist than the North; the real question is whether it remains a sensible policy
to identify and target areas of the country where voting rights problems—
read: minority voting rights problems—are likely to arise.190
This was precisely what the VRA did. The Act was aimed at the South, the
region of the country that had systematically denied the right to vote to
African Americans for decades. This made sense since, pretensions about the
neutrality of the coverage formula aside, “it was very clear which jurisdictions
were the most egregious offenders.”191 But this is much less so today.
Geography explains or predicts only few of our concerns about voting
discrimination.192 Take the current preoccupation with voter photo
identification laws. North Carolina, which had 40 counties designated for
coverage by section 4(b), has recently passed one of the strictest photo
identification requirements in the country.193 Pennsylvania, a non-covered
187. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
188. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41–42, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)
(No. 12-96); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (No. 08-322) (transcribing the Chief Justice’s inquiry as to whether
“southerners are more likely to discriminate than northerners”).
189. See, e.g., Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 7, at 1160–62.
190. See Pildes, supra note 180, at 748–49.
191. Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a Post-Shelby County Contingency
Strategy, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 131, 140 (2013).
192. See, e.g., id.; Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 104; Pildes, supra note 180, at 748–55.
193. See generally North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014)
(issuing a stay to block a Fourth Circuit decision finding portions of North Carolina’s 2013 voter
identification and registration law unconstitutional).

A2_CHARLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN WINTER

4/13/2015 2:11 PM

1425

state, had a similarly strict law until a state trial court judge struck it down.194
Virginia also has a photo identification requirement.195 Wisconsin would like
to have one, but the Supreme Court struck down its law and left in place
permanent injunctions issued by lower courts.196 Texas, a formerly covered
jurisdiction, has a very strict voter photo identification requirement,197 but so
does Indiana,198 which was a non-covered jurisdiction. Georgia, a formerly
covered jurisdiction, has a stringent voter photo identification
requirement.199 Kansas, never a covered jurisdiction, has one as well.200 If
photo identification requirements are the new literacy tests, then section
4(b)’s coverage formula is certainly underinclusive and illogical, perhaps
significantly so.
In Shelby County the Court asks about the indignity to North Carolina of
treating it differently from Indiana, or the indignity to Virginia of being
treated as a constitutional stepchild compared to Pennsylvania. The Court has
been criticized, and rightly so, for caring more about the dignity of states that
for a very long time did all they could to keep black voters from voting, than
for being concerned for the dignity of the citizens who were the purported
beneficiaries of the Reconstruction Amendments.201 But let us shift the angle
of our critical inquiry slightly, from the states to the citizenry. What is the
justification for protecting voters of color when they are in North Carolina
but not in Pennsylvania?202 In Virginia but not in Wisconsin? In Georgia but

194. In January 2014, a state trial court judge held that Pennsylvania’s voter identification
law violated the state’s constitution by impermissibly burdening the fundamental right to vote.
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *18 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Jan. 17, 2014). Governor Tom Corbett has said that the State will not appeal the ruling. Kate
Giammarise, Corbett Says He Will Not Appeal Ruling Against Voter ID Law, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE
(May 8, 2014, 5:16 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2014/05/08/Corbett-sayshe-will-not-appeal-ruling-against-voter-ID-law/stories/201405080318.
195. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-404(A)(3) (Supp. 2014); id. § 24.2-411.1(F).
196. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014) (granting an application to vacate the Seventh
Circuit decision that reversed the district court’s permanent injunction of Wisconsin’s voter
identification law). A less restrictive law went into effect as the Wisconsin’s legislature, and
conservative Supreme Court, remain committed to passing a photo identification law. See WIS.
STAT. § 6.79(2) (Supp. 2014); Tony Mauro, Challenge to Wisconsin Voter ID Law Heads to Supreme
Court, LEGAL TIMES (Jan. 8, 2015, 12:09 PM), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/
id=1202714369835/Challenge-to-Wisconsin-Voter-ID-Law-Heads-to-Supreme-Court.
197. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 15.001 (West 2010 & Supp. 2014). In October 2014, the
Supreme Court refused to vacate the stay entered by the Fifth Circuit on appeal of the district
court’s injunction against the law. Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014).
198. IND. CODE § 3-10-1-7.2 (2006).
199. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (2008).
200. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-1122, -2316c, -2908 (West 2008).
201. See, e.g., Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 191; Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South,
123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175 (2013); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013).
202. Professor Issacharoff has advanced a similar point using Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461
(2003), and Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346 (D.N.J. 2001), to illustrate an analogous point.
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not in Kansas? Is this sensible voting rights policy? If dignity is the measuring
stick, why are some citizens of color owed the dignity of having their voting
rights protected but others less so? (And should this differential treatment
bother us more?) Once again, dissensus abounds.
3. Race v. Partisanship Redux
But even more significant for voting rights policy is the partisan turn that
has characterized the post-civil rights era.203 The leading debate in voting
rights scholarship presently is whether race or partisanship best explains
modern laws regulating political participation.204 Partisanship threatens to
supplant race as the dominant explanatory variable for voting rights policy.205
This debate will direct the shape of the reform agenda into the future. If
partisanship best defines the current voting rights space, then what is the
likelihood of success for a reform agenda that depends upon a paradigm of
racial exclusion? Moreover, how are we to justify judicial supervision of voting
rights policy? If partisanship rather than race best explains modern laws
regulating political participation, can we transfer our account justifying
judicial supervision of racialized politics to the realm of partisanship? If not,
can we justify the judicial supervision of partisan political behavior?
Three developments concerning this partisan turn are pertinent to the
future of voting rights policy. The first development is the transformation of
the South from a one-party region, once dominated by the Democratic Party,
to a region in which the Republican Party is now the majority party. As one
political scientist and expert on southern politics noted, “[t]he emergence of
the Republican party as a realistic alternative to the Democrats is the most
dramatic story in southern politics during the late twentieth and early twentyfirst centuries.”206
This development is important for at least three reasons. First, the
Republican Party can now contend at the national level.207 Second, and most
See Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1710, 1728–29 (2004).
203. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to
Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58 (2014); Overton,
supra note 7.
204. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 203; Issacharoff, supra note 12; Pildes, supra note 180.
205. See Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 100 (arguing that the “current voting controversies,
unlike the concerns of racial exclusion under Jim Crow, are likely motivated by partisan zeal and
emerge in contested partisan environments”).
206. Merle Black, The Transformation of the Southern Democratic Party, 66 J. POL. 1001, 1001
(2004); see also DAVID LUBLIN, THE REPUBLICAN SOUTH: DEMOCRATIZATION AND PARTISAN CHANGE
(2004) (documenting and explaining the slow rise of the Republican Party in the South).
207. EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE RISE OF SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS 2 (2002)
(“Republicans from the South have transformed American politics. The collapse of the solid
Democratic South and the emergence of southern Republicanism, first in presidential politics
and later in elections for Congress, have established a new reality for America: two permanently
competitive national political parties.”).
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obviously, there is political competition in the South whereas before there was
none. Third and less obviously, because of the increased competition between
the two dominant parties, the parties have an incentive to engage in political
rent-seeking by using voting regulation to gain a competitive advantage.
The second development is the complete transformation of the
Democratic Party from a party that was in part indifferent to voting equality—
the Democratic Party in the North—and was in part racist—the Democratic
Party in the South—to a Democratic Party now fully identified as the party
that represents the interest of voters of color. Whereas voters of color, in
particular black voters, were once excluded—and often violently so—from
participation in democratic politics in the one-party South, they are now a key
constituency of the Democratic Party in the South. Moreover, the Democratic
Party in the South is increasingly the party of not just African-American voters
but of Latinos, Asian Americans, and other citizens of color.
The third development is the growing partisan and ideological
polarization that has been a function of American political reality for the last
40 years.208 Though there is a debate within political science literature on
whether the mass public is in fact polarized, few scholars doubt that elites are
polarized and that the parties are as polarized as they have been in
generations. Notwithstanding the dispute in political science literature on
mass polarization, researchers have found strong evidence of partisan sorting,
the process by which voters bring their ideology, liberal or conservative, in
line with their partisan identity. Thus, to quote from an apt title of a recent
book, “liberals became Democrats and conservatives became Republicans.”209
This last development is particularly important because it shows that
voting rights have now been recast as a partisan issue. According to political
scientists Ted Carmines and James Stimson, citizens learn the differences
between the political parties on particular issues after elites take positions in
partisan terms.210 Elite positioning communicates to the citizens the parties’
position on the issues. To the extent that the issue is one that is salient to the
citizens, citizens will bring into line their issue position with their partisan

208. Andrew Garner & Harvey Palmer, Polarization and Issue Consistency over Time, 33 POL.
BEHAV. 225, 226 (2011) (“There is broad scholarly consensus that the political environment has
become more ideologically divided over the past several decades.”).
209. MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: HOW LIBERALS BECAME DEMOCRATS AND
CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS (2009).
210. See generally EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1989); Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson, Issue
Evolution, Population Replacement, and Normal Partisan Change, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 107 (1981);
Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson, On the Structure and Sequence of Issue Evolution, 80 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 901 (1986) [hereinafter Carmines & Stimson, Structure and Sequence]; Edward G.
Carmines & James A. Stimson, The Two Faces of Issue Voting, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 78 (1980).
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identity. Mass polarization will thus reflect elite polarization.211 This
framework has been confirmed by recent work in the field.212
In this new age of party polarization, many issues are filtered through a
partisan lens.213 The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), modeled after a health
exchange program supported and promulgated by Republican thenGovernor of Massachusetts and later Republican nominee for president, Mitt
Romney, is vigorously opposed by Republicans and strongly supported by
Democrats, in significant part because the policy is the signature legislative
achievement of the Democratic President, Barack Obama.214 President
Obama’s frequent reminder that the ACA was a Republican idea has not made
the statute any more popular with Republican voters. When George W. Bush,
the Republican former president, was in the White House, the vast majority
of Democrats opposed the practice of data-mining by the National Security
Agency. Now that Mr. Obama is in the White House, the vast majority of
Democrats now support the practice. A significant proportion of black voters
who were thought to be staunchly opposed to same-sex marriage changed
their issue position after President Obama announced his public support for
the practice. These are examples of a general phenomenon characteristic of
the politics of the early 21st century: taking their cues from political elites,
voters modify their positions on the issue to bring their issue position in line
with their political identity.215
The implications of this hyper-partisanship for voting rights policy is to
transform a cause clothed in the moral righteousness of the civil rights
movement to a cause defined only by partisan politics. At the dawn of the
VRA, the Democratic Party dominated the South. The northern wing of the
party, at the insistence of then-President Lyndon Johnson, with critical
Republican support, overcame the filibuster from Southern Democrats and
enacted the VRA. Voting rights law and policy were a moral crusade. It was

211. As Carmines and Stimson argue, “visible changes in elite behavior serve to redefine party
images, to affect emotional response to the parties, and ultimately to realign the constellation of
voter issue attitudes and party identifications to reflect earlier changes among the elite.”
Carmines & Stimson, Structure and Sequence, supra note 210, at 904.
212. Joseph Bafumi & Robert Y. Shapiro, A New Partisan Voter, 71 J. POL. 1, 21–22 (2009); see
also Matthew S. Levendusky, Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of Elite Polarization, 32
POL. BEHAV. 111, 121–24 (2010) (discussing the results of an experimental test of the
relationship between elite polarization and mass polarization).
213. This is to say, not all issues are similarly prone to such filtering. Saliency is crucial. See
Kara Lindaman & Donald P. Haider-Markel, Issue Evolution, Political Parties, and the Culture Wars,
55 POL. RES. Q. 91, 94–95 (2002).
214. See Health Tracking Poll: Exploring the Public’s Views on the Affordable Care Act (ACA), HENRY
J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/interactive/health-tracking-poll-exploring-the-publicsviews-on-the-affordable-care-act-aca/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
215. This phenomenon is not fully elastic. On some issues voters might be willing to leave
their political party and unwilling to switch their positions.
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not a partisan issue but, in fact, a bipartisan one.216 Indeed, one can describe
the VRA as the outcome of an intra-party fight; the Democratic Party was split
between its northern and southern sections. The northern section won, as
evidenced by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Section 5, the most powerful tool in the VRA toolkit, was sanctioned by a
Democratic president and it “served to ratchet up black political power at the
expense of the encrusted white establishment of the Democratic Party.”217
Today, at the twilight of the Voting Rights Act, voting rights policy itself,
not just the VRA, is not understood as a moral issue, but as a partisan one.
Democrats favor the VRA; Republicans do not. Democrats favor limits on
campaign financing; Republicans do not. Republicans favor strict voter
identification requirements and believe that they are legitimately aimed
toward assuring the integrity of elections; Democrats view voter identification
requirements as attempts to suppress the vote of legitimate voters. As
Professor Samuel Issacharoff noted recently: “No state under Democratic
control passed significant voter identification laws or sought to restrict early
voting or voter access in the run-up to the 2012 presidential elections.”218 The
political parties are ideologically divided on the role of the state in facilitating
political participation.
If partisanship remains the dominant explanatory variable for the
enactment of state laws that regulate political participation, it is not sensible
for voting rights activists to continue to insist on understanding these laws in
racial terms.219 This is so for at least three reasons.
First, as a matter of public policy, the reform agenda is less likely to be
successful if it has misidentified the problem. If the problem is more about
partisanship and less about racism, a race-based solution is imprudent and
bound to fail as a matter of politics. Second, as a matter of constitutional law,
the Court has curtailed Congress’ power to implement a race-based
solution.220 Third, and in our view most importantly, the project of eradicating
the vestiges of racism in voting (the voting rights project) and in society at
216. For example, in the mid-1960s, “whenever he spoke in the South, [Richard Nixon]
iterated his support of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.” 2 STEPHEN
E. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN 1962–1972, at 89 (1989). Similarly, leading
Republicans supported both Acts in Congress. See, e.g., GARY MAY, BENDING TOWARD JUSTICE: THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 149–67 (2013)
(recounting the legislative battle to pass the VRA); Gary May, Over 48 Years, GOP Strays Far from
Voting Rights, CNN (Aug. 7, 2013, 3:35 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/07/opinion/mayvoting-rights-act/.
217. Issacharoff, supra note 202, at 1713.
218. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 103; see also Pildes, supra note 180, at 761 (discussing the
partisan element present in the modern voting rights conversation).
219. We recognize, of course, that race and partisanship are related and have been so
historically. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 203; Overton, supra note 7. But of course, the political
place of African-Americans today and other people of color is obviously different than it was in
at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century.
220. This point is examined by Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 96–97.
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large (the civil rights project) remains an important and necessary endeavor.
Relatedly and just as significantly, the importance of calling out racism is an
important moral stick and a priceless commodity, but it has a diminishing
margin of return. In the aftermath of an opinion in which the Supreme Court
has essentially declared that the era of big racism is over, we should only fight
about race when we are sure that the fight is in fact about race or when the
payoff is only possible if the fight is about race. More concretely: the pursuit
of a race-based remedy for voting rights issues might jeopardize the remaining
provisions of the VRA and the rest of the civil rights agenda.
V. FORGING A NEW CONSENSUS: THREE MODELS
Given the cloud of dissensus gathered over the policy aims of the VRA,
the 2006 renewal process presented an opportunity manqué. Generally,
periodic expirations of a statute by sunset and renewal provisions achieve at
least three goals. First, they provide an opportunity for taking stock. This is a
chance for the political process to determine how well the statutory scheme
has worked and to assess how much progress the statute has made in
accomplishing its goals. Second, this is also an occasion for celebrating
successes. Third, it provides an opportune moment for retooling or updating
the statute to better-fit changed circumstances. Or to put it differently, this is
an opportunity to build a new and perhaps narrower consensus. Theoretically,
as progress is made, Congress ought to discard older and less useful measures
while fashioning new ones to address present and future concerns.
This is what one would have expected Congress to do with the occasion
provided in 2006, but this is not what Congress did. The 2006
Reauthorization Act accomplished two substantive goals. First, the Act
overruled Reno v. Bossier Parish (“Bossier II”). In Bossier II, the Supreme Court
held that the Attorney General must preclear a redistricting plan that may
have been motivated by discriminatory animus if it was not enacted with the
intent to make voters of color worse off.221 Second, Congress overruled Georgia
v. Ashcroft. In Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held that the legislature may trade
safe majority-minority districts—districts in which voters of color are
guaranteed to elect a candidate of their choice—for coalition or influence
districts.222 Note, unfortunately, that both substantive goals of the
Reauthorization Act are backward-looking and only sought to restore the
status quo ante.

221. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000).
222. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 483 (2003). A “coalition district” is a district in which
voters of color are numerous enough to be able to coalesce with like-minded voters in selecting
their candidate of choice. In contrast, “influence districts” are districts where voters of color are
not quite as numerous as in coalition districts, yet their numbers are large enough to allow them
to influence the selection of the district’s candidate. See Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law
Now at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517,
1539–40 (2002).
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We are particularly puzzled by the congressional reversal of Ashcroft,
which was purportedly the Reauthorization Act’s signature accomplishment.
In overturning this decision, Congress sought to return to the status quo ante
and the Court’s opinion in Beer v. United States.223 At issue in Ashcroft was
whether the state, a covered jurisdiction, violated Beer’s non-retrogression
standard when it reduced the percentage of black voters in three state senate
districts from 60.58%, 55.43%, and 62.45% to 50.31%, 50.66%, and 50.80%
respectively.224 The lower court concluded that the reduction was
retrogressive because it reduced the opportunity of African-American voters
in those districts to elect candidates of their choice. The Supreme Court
disagreed. The Court noted that a reduction in the opportunity to elect is
neither the sole nor determinative factor in determining retrogression.
Rather, retrogression is determined by the totality of all applicable
circumstances, “such as the ability of minority voters to elect their candidate
of choice, the extent of the minority group’s opportunity to participate in the
political process, and the feasibility of creating a nonretrogressive plan.”225
In the Reauthorization Act, it is clear that Congress sought to return the
section 5 inquiry to Beer’s mechanical and restrictive retrogression standard,
though the language of the law is far from clear. According to the
Reauthorization Act, covered jurisdictions cannot “diminish[] the ability . . .
[of voters of color] to elect their preferred candidate of choice.”226 The
problem is precisely how one determines who the candidate of choice is and
what it means to diminish the ability to elect that mysterious character. That
Congress did not provide any guidance on either part of the inquiry
exacerbated the problem.227
Determining the “preferred candidate of choice” (“PCOC”) involves a
series of difficult and fundamental policy questions that vary depending upon
political context. Is the PCOC the candidate who emerges after the creation
of a “naturally arising” majority-minority district where one can be created?228
Suppose that there is no “naturally arising” majority-minority district, but the
state can manufacture one—is the representative that is the product of that
district the PCOC? Suppose that the state cannot create a majority-minority
district without violating the Fourteenth Amendment—is the state obligated

223. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (holding a reapportionment plan valid
where it had the effect of improving the position of minority voters).
224. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 472–73.
225. Id. at 479.
226. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2012).
227. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174,
216–17 (2007) (noting that Congress failed to provide guidance on the meaning of “candidate
of choice”).
228. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (applying
a candidate of choice framework).
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to create coalition districts and would the PCOC be the product of that
coalition? What happens when white voters coalesce with enough voters of
color to produce a moderate black candidate such as Denise Majette229 over
the preference of the majority of black voters who would have wanted a more
radical, Cynthia McKinney-type230 of a candidate? Which one is the PCOC?
PCOC is a function of the array of legislative candidate options from
which voters of color must choose. However, those choices are themselves in
large part a function of other prior contextual variables, in particular the
composition of the voting district.231 Political choices do not exist in a vacuum
or in the ideal. PCOC is an endogenous variable. More pointedly, PCOC is an
endogenous contextual variable that can best be evaluated by examining the
totality of circumstances on the ground.232
Ultimately, these types of inquiries force the inquirer to arrive at a
normative determination with respect to the fundamental policy aims of the
VRA in rapidly changing political environments. In order to determine
whether, for example, dismantling a majority-minority district in favor of
three influence districts is an unlawful diminishment of the opportunity of
voters of color to elect their candidate of choice, we must have some shared
understanding about the purpose of the VRA. The absence of such broad
agreement and the disintegration of the old understanding is precisely what
is wreaking havoc with voting rights policy.
Consider three different ways of making sense of the policy aims of the
VRA. First, one can view the VRA as a statute that is directed strictly toward
eliminating racial discrimination in the political process. This is the
discrimination model. Under this model, a state practice would not violate
the Act unless the practice was motivated by racial animus. The discrimination
model is most effective where racial discrimination is rampant and poses
significant concerns in the political process.
Second, one can understand the VRA as a statute that seeks to confer
political autonomy to voters of color as a group unmoored from racial
discrimination. Under this model, which we label the autonomy model, the
participatory right voters of color are not dependent upon the existence of
racial discrimination in voting. The claim is consequential and not expressive.
It is not enough that voters of color are able to register and have their votes
counted. Voters of color must also be able to wield consequential political
power.

229. Majett, Denise L., U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/People/
Detail/18762 (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
230. McKinney, Cynthia Ann, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/
People/Detail/17982 (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
231. See generally David T. Canon et al., The Supply Side of Congressional Redistricting: Race and
Strategic Politicians, 1972–1992, 58 J. POL. 846 (1996).
232. Recall here Judge Robinson’s district court opinion in Beer. Beer v. United States, 374
F. Supp. 363, 384 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
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Third, one can think of voting rights policy in universalist terms. Under
this universal voting rights model, the VRA would be a statute that protects a
constellation of rights collectively understood as voting rights. On this view,
the VRA would not be about race or people of color. It would be a statute that
guarantees a positive right to political participation to all voters in all
jurisdictions. This VRA would be potentially applicable to any state statute that
burdens the right of any individual or identifiable group of people to
participate in the political process.
Each model is currently represented in one form or another in voting
rights policy. One can easily see the racial discrimination model at work in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach and Allen, two key pillars of that model. The racial
discrimination model is also the best framework for understanding the
current coverage formula under section 4 and the preclearance requirement
under section 5. The coverage formula presumes that we have identified the
relevant bad actors and the preclearance requirement is a concession to the
fact that we are unable to recognize their bad acts without closer scrutiny.
One can also find the autonomy model at work in voting rights policy
and jurisprudence. This model may be the best framework for making sense
of section 2 of the VRA as amended in 1982. Note that the Gingles factors,
which determine when majority-minority districts can be drawn, do not
include a racial discrimination inquiry.233 As long as the minority group is
sufficiently large and cohesive, and has different political preferences than
the white majority, majority-minority districts can be an appropriate remedy.
In the absence of a discrimination inquiry, the racial discrimination model
cannot explain why we recognize the concept of racial vote dilution under
section 2 of the VRA. The concept of vote dilution, rend from a racial
discrimination inquiry, is perfectly sensible where voters of color are
normatively entitled to wield consequential political power on political group
autonomy grounds.
Some tendrils of the universal model extend to voting rights law and
policy. In some respects, the incorporation of language minorities in the VRA
and the inclusion within the coverage formula of jurisdictions that require
election materials to be produced in English-only is a small gesture in the
direction of the universal model. The promulgation of the Help America Vote
Act is clearly an attempt to move voting rights law and policy in a universalist

233. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986) (interpreting the 1982 Amendments
to section 2 of the VRA and establishing what became known as the Gingles factors: (1) whether
“the minority group . . . is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority
in a single-member district”; (2) whether “the minority group . . . is politically cohesive”; and
(3) whether “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special
circumstances . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate”).
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direction.234 Moreover, the political and judicial debate over the lawfulness of
voter identification requirements and felony disenfranchisement provisions is
most fruitful when framed not in racial discrimination terms but in
universalist political participation terms. After all, what is the justification for
being more disturbed when an African-American man is denied the right to
vote in a state because of prior criminal conviction than when a white woman
is denied the same right for the same reason?
The need to grapple with these models could not be more important.
This is because, without question, we are in “a transitional moment in
American democracy.”235 Voting rights law and policy oscillates among these
three models as we witness the decline of the racial discrimination model. The
type of overt racism that gave rise to the VRA in the last century has virtually
disappeared,236 there is evidence that racial bloc voting has decreased,237 and
the public policy preferences of voters of color are perceptibly, though slowly,
diffuse.238 Against this backdrop, the discrimination model is difficult to
sustain. But the extent of racial progress is also difficult to ascertain. Simply,
we live in a period of uncertainty.
With voting rights policy at a crossroads, this is precisely where
Congressional leadership is crucial.239 Congress is the more competent
decision maker because of its ability to engage in systematic empirical or
policy analysis. The costs of decision making in this period of uncertainty
increase when courts, which are ill-equipped to engage in the systematic
overview of the empirical issues raised by the VRA, assume primary policy
making responsibilities. In order to see this more clearly, consider once more
the dispute over Georgia v. Ashcroft and Beer v. United States.
From the perspective of the autonomy model, Ashcroft is as right a voting
rights case as we have seen from the Supreme Court in a long time. This is

234. Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2012) (providing financial
support and assistance for general-election administration purposes, as well as establishing
minimum requirements for election administration).
235. Pamela S. Karlan, The Reconstruction of Voting Rights, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION
OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 34, 35 (Guy-Uriel E.
Charles et al. eds., 2011).
236. See Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting
Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 188 (2005).
237. See, e.g., Zoltan L. Hajnal, White Residents, Black Incumbents, and a Declining Racial Divide,
95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 603, 613 (2001).
238. For a review of the literature, see generally Maria Krysan, Prejudice, Politics, and Public
Opinion: Understanding the Sources of Racial Policy Attitudes, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 135 (2000).
239. In a very interesting and important article, Professor Ellen Katz has argued that neither
Congress nor the Court is good at figuring out how to update statutes that prescribe remedies for
racial discrimination. See generally Ellen D. Katz, Engineering the Endgame, 109 MICH. L. REV. 349
(2010). She argues that Congress is overly slow to respond to changing circumstances while the
Court is too quick to change course and that neither approach is satisfactory. Id. at 351.

A2_CHARLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/13/2015 2:11 PM

THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN WINTER

1435

because this decision fatally undermined the Court’s decision in Beer.240 Beer
imposed both a floor and a ceiling on the electoral prospects of voters of color
and did so in a way that is completely contrary to the aims of the VRA. Under
Beer, as long as a jurisdiction did not make voters of color worse off, the
jurisdiction did not violate section 5. That standard might be fine depending
upon the baseline, but under Beer the baseline could be 1965. Thus, section
5 under Beer did not require progress or improvement; it simply did not
permit retrogression—as if one could retrogress from zero.
In contrast to Beer, the underlying premise of Ashcroft is that section 5
must be sufficiently flexible to allow for progress. Where voters of color are
inefficiently grouped—as, say, in a 60% black voting-age population district—
the state may reduce the number of voters of color in that district and spread
them to other districts as to allow them to aggregate with like-minded others
or to have a greater impact on electoral outcomes. Of course, whether that
strategy is worth pursuing depends upon contextual factors for which risk is a
function of the denouement of real world circumstances. This is not quite “a
sea of imponderables.”241 Some of the factors, such as the extent of racial bloc
voting and white crossover voting, are sufficiently ponderable. But others are,
admittedly, less so.
In periods of uncertainty one needs “a solution that accommodates
imponderables and does not demand precision where the nature of the
subject can yield only approximations.”242 The Court’s decision in Ashcroft was
such an attempt to implement a contextual and nuanced approach that
deemphasized the focus on PCOC and introduced other variables into the
equation.243
The difficult issue presented in Ashcroft (and Beer) is this: how should the
Court assess whether state actors are moving voters of color around in order
to enhance or to diminish their electoral prospects?244 All of the justices in

240. It is of course ironic that Congress and the civil rights community clamored to resurrect
an opinion—Beer—that had long been viewed as inimical to voting rights. Granted, in assessing
the outcome in Georgia v. Ashcroft, Congress and the civil rights community were possibly
distracted by the fact that the right approach in that case came from the Court’s conservatives.
241. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 290 (2004).
242. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. United States, 356 U.S. 421, 463 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
243. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 479 (2003) (“[A]ny assessment of the retrogression
of a minority group’s effective exercise of the electoral franchise depends on an examination of
all the relevant circumstances, such as the ability of minority voters to elect their candidate of
choice, the extent of the minority group’s opportunity to participate in the political process, and
the feasibility of creating a nonretrogressive plan.”).
244. Justice Marshall raised similar questions in his Beer dissent:
Is an increase in the size of an existing majority ameliorative or retrogressive? When
the size of the majority increases in one district, Negro voting strength necessarily
declines elsewhere. Is that decline retrogressive? Assuming that the shift from a
50.2% to a 52.6% majority in District B in this case is ameliorative, and is not
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Ashcroft agreed that some moving around is warranted, in light of changed
circumstances—and particularly the appreciable decrease in racial bloc
voting in covered jurisdictions. Depending upon the factual circumstances,
for example, a 60% black district could be vote dilution by packing. What
divided the Court was determining how to assess the appropriate level of risk
and who should bear the risk of an incorrect assessment.
If one believes that state actors cannot be trusted because they will take
every opportunity to discriminate, then Beer is the preferred default option
and the discrimination model is the preferred model. The civil rights
community thought the Court’s decision in Ashcroft would undermine the
VRA by permitting state actors to dismantle majority-minority districts and
replace them with coalition or—even worse, from the perspective of civil
rights groups—influence districts, in which voters of color could not control
but could only influence the outcome of an election.
Here, tremendous trade-offs are needed. As a consequence, Congress is
the best institution for providing the facts necessary to accurately assess the
risks. How much has racial bloc voting declined in covered jurisdictions? To
what extent are state actors intent on discriminating against voters of color in
the political process? Are political incumbents trustworthy guardians of the
political interests of voters of color? Should states have the option to
implement alternative voting structures and escape review of
reapportionment plans? How should we balance competing claims to political
autonomy among the different racial groups?245 These are the types of
questions that Congress is better positioned to answer, rather than courts
under the inherent limitations of the adjudicatory process.246
But Congress could not overcome the political constraints that would
enable it to take on these hard questions and modernize the Act.247 It could
only do the next best thing: set these hard questions aside for another day.
Political avoidance perfectly explains Congress’s behavior when it was faced

outweighed by the simultaneous decrease in Negro voting strength in Districts A and
C, when would an increase become retrogressive?
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 153–54 n.12 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
245. It is clear that voting rights cases are no longer between black and white interests, or
Latino, but now include claims by Asian–Americans and the distinctive problems faced by Native
Americans. See generally Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (confronting a claim of
Hispanic vote dilution); Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992) (in bank) (considering a claim
of Asian vote dilution).
246. This is precisely the reason that the Court in Georgia v. Ashcroft used Rep. John Lewis as
a proxy for determining the best interest of voters of color in Georgia. The Court itself was
unsure, but found that if the civil rights icon, whose testimony the Court said “is not so easily
dismissed,” gave his seal of approval, that was good enough for the conservative justices. Ashcroft,
539 U.S. at 489.
247. Persily, supra note 227, at 191–92.
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with the difficult choice of revamping the VRA for a different world.248
Though there was deep disagreement in Congress among both supporters
and opponents of the Act regarding the continued utility of section 5 and the
changes that needed to be made to the VRA to modernize its provision,
Congress felt politically compelled to pass the Reauthorization Act, which
essentially preserved the status quo.249 Notwithstanding the fact that the
political realities have changed dramatically since the Act first passed250 and
the same statutory scheme has now been in place for over 40 years,251
Congress proved unable to modify the preclearance process in any way or
update section 2 to address current realities.
Renewal of the status quo was the only point of consensus; it was the least
common denominator of agreement among the different factions. The civil
rights community strongly favored renewal. The Democrats had to favor
renewal because their relevant constituencies did too. The Republican
leadership in both houses favored renewal as well because the Republican
President committed early to renewal. Politically, no one had an incentive
against renewal.
Further, given that the consensus existed solely over the status quo, the
political benefits derived from the symbolism of preserving the status quo—
or ostensibly restoring the status quo ante by reversing Bossier II and Ashcroft—
outweighed the political costs of asking the hard questions regarding the
meaning and the future of the Act. Rethinking the direction of the VRA would
have destabilized the fragile coalition that came together in favor of renewal.
It would have required Congress to go back to the drawing board and
confront fundamental questions such as whether this current structural
model of apportioning political power is necessary. Because the existing
consensus on the policy aims of the VRA had frayed, but there was nothing in
place to replace it, destabilization was a likely outcome. One politically
perilous possibility of such rethinking would have been the sunset of section
5. However, neither Republicans nor Democrats were interested in being the
entities that killed this superstatute, “a sacred symbol of American
democracy.”252
Consequently, Congress ducked all of the difficult policy questions to
avoid making tough decisions that would be politically costly and potentially

248. Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance, Constitutional Theory and the VRA, 117 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 148, 148 (2007) (“Constitutional theory and design have been dominated by the
specter of legislative and executive institutions voraciously seeking to expand their powers. But
in modern political practice, the flight from political responsibility—the problem of political
abdication—is at least as serious a threat.”).
249. Persily, supra note 227, at 191–92; James Thomas Tucker, The Politics of Persuasion:
Passage of the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization Act of 2006, 33 J. LEGIS. 205, 267 (2007).
250. See Issacharoff, supra note 202, at 1712.
251. Or 25 years, if one counts from the time of the 1982 amendments.
252. Pildes, supra note 248, at 152.
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destabilizing. By providing a 25-year extension of section 5, Congress would
not be forced to revisit this statutory scheme until 2031. Everyone, particularly
the civil rights community, declared victory and went home.
Congress’s gamble was that the courts would resolve the difficult
questions. This was not an altogether irresponsible gambit. Under the
cooperative framework dictated by the partnership model, there was a
sufficiently strong possibility that the Court would continue to step in and
make the tough calls that Congress could not make for political reasons. In
fact, this is the historical evolution of the Act in a nutshell. The question that
the Court faced and continues to face was whether it ought to cooperate with
Congress’s abdication of political responsibility. Ordinarily, one might say
that the courts should do what they have always done with respect to the VRA:
make the policy decisions as best as they can. But these are not ordinary
circumstances.
The fundamental policy judgments that courts are having to make about
the future of the VRA, and the choice among different models of the VRA are
more difficult than they have ever been. Courts do not have the institutional
competence to make these difficult policy judgments. Increasingly, judicial
decisionmaking with respect to the VRA is less about effectuating a
democratic consensus with respect to the policy aims of the VRA—namely, to
rid the electoral process of racial discrimination—and more about choosing
between competing normative models of the VRA’s purpose. The Chief
Justice’s complaint that the Act fails to account for current political realities
is a fair indictment.
Moreover, superstatutory interpretation, which depends upon a
partnership among the branches, functions best where each branch is pulling
its own weight and contributing to the resolution of the public policy problem
that is the aim of the statute. Congress is proving itself unable to make any
more significant contributions, and the Court is no longer willing to decide
the next phase of voting rights policy. The executive branch is, for now, the
last actor standing. The era of cooperation is over.
VI. CONCLUSION
Voting rights policy and the VRA stand at a crossroads. Long considered
the most successful civil rights statute in American history, the regulatory
model that sustained the Act for decades is no longer tenable today. Think
about the fact that the VRA was once untouchable. It has been described as
“one of the crown jewels of the civil rights movement.”253 In the midst of its
federalism revolution the Court signaled the VRA as essentially model
legislation. We have come a long way since those halcyon days. We may never
see them again. The superstatute that we knew as the VRA is now a shell of its
old self.
253

Crum, supra note 13, at 1994.
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In this Article we sought to provide an explanation for the fall of this
superstatute. Fundamentally, the consensus about racial discrimination that
supported the VRA has dissolved. The racial discrimination consensus
suffered a mortal blow from Shelby County. Going forward, two competing
models are available. First is the political autonomy model, which demands
that voters of color wield consequential political power simply because they
are citizens of the polity. Second is the universal voting rights model, which
understands the VRA as protecting a constellation of rights apart from race
or color.
To save the VRA, those interested in voting rights policy will need to build
support for a model other than the racial discrimination model. But it might
be that we can no longer develop the political consensus for moving voting
rights policy forward—in which case, we will continue to muddle through. We
must be sober-eyed about the task forward; the time for sentimentalism is
over. Dissolution also presents an opportunity for rebirth.

